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Abstract
Many scholars have sought to investigate the impact foreign aid has on recipient states.
Much of the literature suggests that the strategic linkages of the donor-recipient dyad are key in
explaining outcome variance. This paper examines that assumption further by looking at the
relationship between US aid outlays and their impact with respect to democracy. Because the
diffusion of democratic values has been a pillar of American foreign policy dating back to the
Wilson era, one might expect American aid to be linked to good governance. I argue, however,
that the national security concerns at the time assistance is disbursed has a significant effect on
this goal. In a heightened security environment (Cold War), aid and democracy should be
negatively associated. In a lowered security environment (post-Cold War) it should be positively
linked. I examine aid’s impact during these two periods and add yet another era, post 9/11. If
security concerns are peaking once again due to the war on terror, American assistance may have
shifted from prompting positive political change to the procurement of terror combating alliances.
Moreover, the conditionality of democratic improvement placed on aid is diminished when partner
states are aware of their strategic value. While democracy is said to be an elixir to conflict, in the
pursuit of these non-state actors, current American foreign policy may be harming its growth. I
use the Freedom House democracy index, USAID data, and Cox proportional hazard models to
test this relationship across distinct time periods between 1972 and 2010.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1

Origins of American Aid
At a speech at Harvard in June of 1947, then Secretary of State George Marshall

commented on rebuilding the global economy after WWII. Noting the importance of a steadfast
recovery, Secretary Marshall outlined America’s potential contribution to such a cause. Through
cooperation and coordination between the United States and Europe, a program of “friendly aid”
could be developed to mend the war torn continent (OECD, 2016). The policy outcome was the
Marshall Plan, a comprehensive assistance regime launched the following year. Financial support
would be designated to those genuinely committed to the promotion of free institutions, economic
integration, and economic interdependence (May, 1948). Just as importantly, this assistance would
be safeguarded from those who decided to hinder such progress. The broader and long term goal
was to establish a sense of unity; economically, socially and politically, while minimizing the
likelihood of another world conflict (May, 1948).
Since that time, America’s commitment to the promotion of values espoused by Secretary
Marshall have burgeoned significantly. Outlays are provided to at-risk and poverty stricken states
across every global region. The mission statement of the primary organization tasked with
handling aid programs, the United States Assistance for International Development agency
(USAID), is to “end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing
our security and prosperity” (USAID, 2016). The agency provides the public and policymakers
progress on the activities they engage in, where aid is working best and where it is not. Historically,
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conditions for American assistance have been tied to a general set of principles advocating free
governance and cooperative economic development.
Promotion of “democratic societies” and the advancement of American “security and
prosperity”, however, do not always go hand in hand (Ake, 1996). Over the past decades, the
United States has found itself allied with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.
These states all receive substantial aid dollars, are arguably lynchpins of regional security, but lag
behind democratically. Jordan, a staunch ally in the fight against terrorism and recipient of 785
million dollars in 2011, does little better in their quality of governance (USAID 2016; Freedom
House, 2016). More recently, close ties have been cultivated with autocratic Cuba and Vietnam,
the latter of which is has consistently been granted economic and military aid since 2005, according
to USAID. Other states like Brazzaville (Congo) and Djibouti have millions attributed to them,
but the data reveals they remain in adverse economic and democratic conditions.
Given these observations, it seems reasonable to question the evolution of American
assistance programs since their inception in 1948. This thesis sets out to investigate the puzzle of
American foreign aid, its purposes and its efficacy by shedding light on two primary research
questions. First, how effective has foreign assistance been at accomplishing its goal of democratic
promotion? Second, under what security circumstances is it more effective or less effective? To
best contribute to the literature, I adopt a narrow approach by looking at the relationship between
American disbursements and democracy over time, specifically. This method allows for a strong
focus to be placed on the complex concept of democracy. Additionally, it may provide insights
into US foreign policy behavior toward security salient states such as those mentioned above.

2

1.2

Research Significance
Despite a recent uptick in the literature, foreign aid is an underappreciated topic in political

science. Those who have studied aid, tend to focus on multilateral disbursements from
international institutions. On effectiveness, several theories have been advanced as to why aid fails
or succeeds in democratic promotion, or economic growth. One explanation proposes that when a
recipient country’s strategic value is high for its donor, conditions placed on assistance can be
more readily ignored (Dunning, 2004). Others view the dynamic game theoretically, where office
holders strategize aid acceptance and policy concessions to maximize their prospects of staying in
power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007). Generally, the body of work on assistance outcomes
is mired in ambiguity. Some scholars view assistance as an ineffective employment of resources
(Easterly 2006; Knack 2004). Others, though, find it to have positive outcomes (Goldsmith 2001;
Girod 2012; Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2007).
The donor-recipient relationship, too, is often difficult to untangle when working with large
N studies, multilateral aid, and time dependent data. Research with multiple countries make it
inherently difficult, if not unfeasible, to pinpoint particular dyadic motivations. Multilateral aid is
considered to be dissimilar from its bilateral, nation to nation variant and should be examined
distinctly (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Analyzing the behavior of an individual donor under these
multisource conditions is impossible because one cannot assess how much influence one state has
compared to another. When these transactions between dyads occur is equally important to
consider since world events are said to alter the priorities of donor nations (Bearce and Tirone
2010; Dunning 2004; Goldsmith 2001; Starr and Lindborg 2003). The start of the Cold War, the
and fall of the Soviet Union are some examples of major historical shifts to consider if looking at
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aid in the American context. By recognizing these temporal differences, better explanations can
be theorized and lead to superior extrapolations.
Rather than looking holistically at all aid sources, like previous studies, the goal here is to
analyze the behavior of one donor country, the United States, and the outcome of democracy.
Building on the strategy components posited by Dunning (2004), Bearce and Tirone (2010), and
the suggestions by Starr and Lindborg (2003) and Alesina and Dollar (2000), I develop my own
theory of American foreign policy and aid. I integrate foreign policy strategy considerations,
bilateral assistance and different historical circumstances, to provide a richer account of events.
This method should also yield clearer observations about the efficacy of assistance program
overall.
I argue that normative aid objectives, such as democracy, are best achieved during more
peaceful historical periods like the post-Cold War years. By contrast, when the threat of conflict
is heightened or security concerns elevated (like the Cold War) these goals are often pushed aside.
During the latter time frame, procurement of alliances and a need to strategize with a variety of
governments weakens the conditionality placed upon aid. These conditions can include adherence
to good governance, the adoption of good fiscal policies and improved human rights records.
Recipients, aware of their usefulness, can avoid reforms and ignore donor directives with little
consequence of losing aid disbursement. Aid acts as a reward for policy concessions. These
concessions are favored by the donor in the short term over other normative issues sought in the
long term. In relatively peaceful periods, however, conditionality is better enforced since the
recipient has more to lose than the donor.
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While it may be desirable to see responsive governance across the world, immediate
security stresses re-shape foreign policy objectives hierarchically. In other words, more virtuous
goals fall to the bottom, while pressing security issues rise to the top. The Cold War often saw
American alliances of convenience with less than wholesome regimes. These states often received
significant amounts of money with no apparent condition for improved governance. This, of
course, runs contrary to one of the stated purposes of foreign aid; democratic diffusion. It marks a
telling departure from the proclamations of Secretary Marshall and a stark illustration of the
evolution of aid as a tool of foreign policy.
This project goes one step further, delving beyond the usual Cold War, post-Cold-War
differentiation and also examines the post- 9/11 period. It is possible that after the most devastating
sets of attacks on American soil, policy actions and aid became more strategic. Could the actions
of non-state actors be sufficient enough to alter national security concerns on a global scale similar
to when the Soviet Union existed? Several reasons indicate that they can. Following 9/11, two
major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan resulting in regime changes took place. American and
coalition troops from across the world continue to be on the ground on these hot spots a decade
and a half later. A new cabinet level department was created to address terrorism threats in the
homeland and restructure the intelligence apparatus. In another parallel, two presidents from both
major political parties have engaged in this war on terror. Indeed, one might suspect aid is once
again geared more toward security, strategy and the procurement of allies, regardless of their
democratic performance. If democratic diffusion has already stalled across the globe, its ability to
rebound seems less likely if these assumptions about aid hold true.
An analysis of American aid and democratization accomplishes three scholastic aims. First,
it adds to the literature about the effectiveness of assistance programs and positive democratic
5

outcomes. Second, it examines American aid specifically as a function of its foreign policy across
different historical periods, a topic not often examined. Lastly, it provides potential implications
for the development of democracy during the ongoing war on terror. This paper attempt to add
further understanding to these subjects of interest to policymakers and academics alike.

1.3

Outline
In order to answer the research questions of this thesis, further elaboration on the topics of

foreign aid, and democracy are required. The following chapter are structured to present a clearer
picture of both concepts generally, and their interconnections to each other. Chapter 2 begins with
a discussion on democracy, how it is defined and how it is measured. A comprehensive review of
the foreign aid literature follows, discussing the varied and contrasting positions of scholars.
Additionally, I look at the international relations literature which lends credence to the argument
state security and strategy is, or should be, the top priority of any sovereign entity. Tying these
arguments together, chapter 3 puts forth a theory of American foreign policy with assistance at the
heart of the discussion. US policymakers prefer to make good strides toward global
democratization, but may be limited by system level factors. The tool of aid is important in
achieving democratic shifts and may be generally successful provided that security considerations
are not at their most salient. To test these assumptions, I take USAID data and divide my periods
of observation between the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post 9/11. While some studies take the
viewpoint that the conditionality of aid increased during the 1990’s as a given (and was therefore
more effective), I re-test those assumptions here. Chapter 4, part one, discusses the nuances of the
data, their sources and variable measurements. Control variables considered important in the
evaluation of democratic consolidation studies are included here, as well. The second section
6

reviews the statistical method used, Cox proportional hazards regression, a survival model
common in the medical field, and engineering analysis. The results are presented in the third
section. Chapter 5 discusses the outcome, implications, and avenues for future research. I add to
the literature by including a post 9/11 epoch, which may have altered the effectiveness of aid with
respect to democracy due to a potential increase in strategic needs.

7

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In order discuss the theoretical arguments of this paper, the concepts of foreign aid and
democratization need thorough clarification. For democracy, its definitional scope is linked to its
empirical construction and thus, conclusions that are drawn. Foreign aid, meanwhile, may come
in several forms and be used for different purposes. This literature review begins by explaining
how democracy is thought of and measured in the academic world. Then, the institutionalization
of American foreign assistance and the different configurations it takes are described. Most aid
studies tend to research multilateral assistance sources as opposed to the dyadic relationships I
investigate here. Despite this, an overview of aid effectiveness (or lack of) in multilateral settings,
provides as a baseline to understand how assistance may or may not work. Moreover, these studies
illustrate how conditionality and strategy are present in the decision making calculus of
distributors. Lastly, a brief overview of realist thought in international relations is provided, as
several of its key pillars are important assumptions in the theory of foreign policy presented in
chapter 3.

2.1

What is Democracy and Why Democracy?
Many may associate the term “democracy” with personal freedoms, civil liberties and

opportunities to voice meaningful political opposition. Yet, these fanciful constructs do not always
match reality. This then begs the question, what makes up a democracy? How is the term
conceptualized? How do you identify it when you see it? Bollen (1991) observes that some studies
from the 1950’s to 1960’s simply looked at voter turnout to make assessments. He astutely points
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out that some regimes require turnout in elections that are predicated on fraud. Turnout can also
be affected by more insignificant occurrences, such as a heavy rain, or weather generally.
In recent research, more than one country characteristic is sought, and rightfully so. Still,
attempts to put together concrete definitions has resulted in some academic stalemate. In perhaps
the most influential work on the topic, Dahl (1971), puts forth eight prerequisites. These are,
freedom to form or join an organization; freedom of expression; alternative informational sources;
right to vote; office eligibility; right to competition by political leaders; free and fair elections; and
ensuring government policy depends on the people’s consent. These criteria, though, require
additional specification that is also lacking in consensus. How is “freedom of expression” gauged,
or to what extent must a country allow its citizens the right to vote, for example? Is the imposition
of age requirements or voter ID cards appropriate or do they go too far? Does limiting where and
when protests can occur an infringement of freedom of expression? These details are important
points of discussion to comparative politics scholars and there is not one set way to interpret them.
Two other well-known researchers in the field, Schmitter and Karl (1991) provide the
following definition:
“Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”
Despite its apparent parsimony, like Dahl’s constructs, this lends itself to further inquiry about
what exactly makes up accountability or adequate competition between seekers of power. Elklit
and Svensson (1997) speaking on commonly used phrases, point out that language such as “free
and fair” are subjective. It is possible (and does occur) for a regime to grant its citizens the freedom
9

to vote and claim that it is fair, but is it really democratic? After all, elections may occur in China
with candidates running for several posts, each with an opportunity to win and people able to
choose. Neglected in such an election, however, is any form of party competition because all the
candidates run under the same communist umbrella. Similarly, other regimes permit the minimal
existence of civic groups and independent press outlets to project legitimacy, but ensure that
influence is marginal and their seats in office are secure (Carothers 2006). Karl (1986) writes of a
civil liberties requirement in so-called democratic countries. Lacking these protections, coercion
by the state or non-state groups can intimidate the actions of political participants. Most definitions
today include clauses about the basic civil liberties Karl talks about alongside freedoms of speech
and the press (Mainwaring 1989). To be sure, democracy is a complex idea requiring
comprehensive but consistent definitional criteria in academia.
The scope of a definition is important because it naturally leads to operationalization of the
concept. Beyond the argument of using open ended versus thorough detailing, there are disputes
about employing a dichotomous or ordinal, grade-like measure. One on side, scholars will argue a
nation is a democracy or it is not. Hewitt (1977) uses a present or absent method based on suffrage,
elections, and executive and legislative power balancing institutions. Geddes (1999) likewise
advocates a binary approach when conducting analysis. This method enables researchers to avoid
ambiguity through the presence or absence of certain criteria. A black and white judgment of
complex political situations, however, opens itself to criticisms of rigidity and missed
observations. Citing that concern, other researchers call for more sophisticated levels of precision.
Bollen (1991) fears dichotomous variables may create a “lumping of countries” into one
group when those entities are clearly divergent in their levels of political openness. There are many
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examples that may come to mind, such as a comparison of Sierra Leon and Canada. Both may be
considered as democratic, but Sierra Leon had been victimized by civil war roughly a decade ago
and has continued to struggle for stability. Canada, in the meantime, has been peaceful and
democratic for much longer with no challenge to that assertion. In a dichotomous setting, both
would fall under the same category. Is this appropriate or would a measurement instrument that
reveals their differences work best? In Elkins’ (1999) work on conflict, graded measures bring to
light more illuminating results that would have been missed otherwise. Over time, the binary
argument has appeared to lose momentum in political science scholarship.
More recent work in the field has trended toward using the gradation option. In fact, the
two most popular democracy and freedom indexes, Polity and Freedom House, use point scales
for their ratings. The view of this paper is that simply because two states share democratic parallels,
does not make them equals functionally. Scholars wedded to a yes or no style, are more prone to
error and thus, to missing valuable empirical insights as seen in Elkins (1999). As such, I argue
robust instruments accounting for variances in freedom should be used in academic research.
One such instrument is the well-known democracy tracking group mentioned above,
Freedom House, which opts for a more fully developed, graded conceptualization this paper will
adopt. Its definitional criteria include human rights, respect for civil society, freedom of
expression, rule of law, elections, and religious freedoms. The organization uses a point system
ranging from 1, “most free”, to 7, “least free”. These scores are the sum of 10 political rights and
15 civil liberties indicators presented to their contributors consisting of “in-house and external
analysts and expert advisers from the academic, think tank, and human rights communities”
(Freedom House. 2016). These analysts compile data from multiple sources including academic
evaluations, newspaper articles, and information from non-governmental organizations. Through
11

said sources, judges consider events within the territorial entity in question and generate a yearly
numerical score for every country. One of three labels are placed on a state; “free”, “partly free”,
and “not free”. Specific details are discussed in the data section.
The positive aspect to this more rigorous criteria is that the measure is robust, the negative
part is that critics may view it as too robust. More recently, the tracking group has brought attention
to freedom on the internet as well as the protection of rights for LGBT peoples. It is certainly
possible that expectations for an LGBT category, for instance, may be too high. Not every country
in a democratic trajectory may be as progressive on such topics and their full acceptance of
individual liberties may still be inchoate. In India, for instance, there is debate about the fate of
legislative section 377, which criminally punishes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature
with any man, woman or animal” (Dhume 2015). Despite such laws on the books, India is often
praised as being a great example of democratic success. Similarly, a democratizing country
exerting a degree of control to online accessibility cannot be placed on a level similar to China,
where the internet is methodically censored.
These issues all go back to the heart of the debate about what is a democracy. Personal
judgements and mental heuristics may give a degree of leeway to particular states, or punish others
unevenly. Freedom House is certainly not immune to individual biases (Goldsmith 2001). These
rankings are structured, however, to avoid these issues as best as can be avoided. The index is
widely used and accepted both in academia and by aid sources such as USAID, and I believe
suitable for this project.
A brief perusal of descriptive data from Freedom House show there have been many
changes from democracy, to autocracy, and back, over the years. These alterations can occur
12

multiple times within short periods in the same country. Likewise, they can be very rare events in
some places if they even occur at all. A good example of the latter is the United States, where no
changes from what Freedom House would label “free” has occurred in the dataset’s history. Such
movements in governance are defined as political “transitions”. There is no one reason or cause
for why these interludes occur, in fact, there are multiple types of transitions that are said to exist.
Mainwaring and Share (1989) provides a well-developed and useful typology of such shifts on
Table 1.

Table 1: Types of Transitions
Transition through transaction

Cost of staying in power increase, cost of
liberalization decrease
Costs increase due to succession crisis
Costs increase due to lack of military cohesion
Costs increase due to declining legitimacy
Intervention occurs during crisis, designed to
be a temporary undemocratic step

Transition through extraction

Weakened autocratic regime, but sufficiently
strong to negotiate political shifts

Transition through regime defeat

Autocracy fails, collapses, or is overthrown

Some nations stumble along the democratic path more than others, such as Argentina,
which has experienced seven changes to its Freedom House ranking from 1972 to 2011. The
1970’s were particularly tumultuous with escalating violence from far right and far left groups, as
13

well as a coup d’état in 1976 by a military junta. Any attempts at political stability seemed to be
immediately marred down by battling opposition groups and governmental oppression. It was not
until the 1983 elections when a steadier government took charge. Argentina has often walked on
thin political ice, but has become fairly consistent across the past three decades.
Their encouraging improvements aside, this contrasts greatly to states which have made
seamless transitions. Mongolia is a shining example of this. Sandwiched between Russia and
China, one might expect to find a former satellite state of both those major world powers to be in
bad democratic shape. In fact, Mongolia went from full autocracy under their communist
leadership to full democracy within two years. This episode was devoid of violence and quite
adaptive to a new world system which left other former communist states in shambles. Indeed, the
course a country takes, turbulent or passive, can have major reverberations. Volatile democratic
transitions carry the added risk of conflict onset, as opposed to more stable political shifts (Ward
and Gleditsch 1998).
To fine tune the definition of a transition and to differentiate directionality, two terms are
introduced. Since this paper views democratic improvements as a good thing, a positive transition
is one where a country moves from autocracy to democracy. A negative transition is one where a
democracy backslides to autocracy. Positive transitions in countries should ideally result in the
eventual development of a free and politically responsive regime. In political science scholarship,
this successful post-development phase is typically called “consolidation”. Consolidation, like
democracy, can still be cumbersome to define.
In a working group meeting of leading democracy scholars in 1985, Terry Karl viewed
consolidation as a building up of certainty. This observation lends validity to the assumption that
14

transitioning state outcomes are inherently unknown. The first phase for an undemocratic state to
consolidate democratically, is to transition. This is the uncertain stage. For consolidation to be
achieved, certainty, as Karl says, must built up. It is worth questioning, however, whether or not
consolidation is even a plausible phenomenon in the first place. One overlooked but obvious
reason, advanced by Mainwaring (1986), is that no democracy is impregnable. There is no form
of immunity or political vaccine to stop a regime from democratic collapse. In social science, just
about anything is possible from time to time. If this is the case, can a country ever be
“consolidated?”
This philosophical grappling can result in good progress on an abstract level, but can be
headache inducing to quantitative analysts. If no true consolidation can exist, how can successful
democracies be distinguished? Are countries in a perpetual state of transition no matter how long
they are rated as “free” by any measure? Perhaps the best way to view this conundrum is through
the prism of durability. I put forth my best definitional attempt here. “Consolidation” is when a
society adopts and legitimizes democratic ideals, a ballots above bullets approach, as its standard
for bringing about political change in a manner expected to be durable. If democracy should
include civil rights and liberties, then those cannot be violated through use of force by nongovernmental actors or threats of excessive force by governmental bodies. The use of bullets
should not be considered by opposition groups. Likewise, a regime must not abuse its monopoly
on force by persecuting its citizens, regardless of political stripes.
Returning to the quantitative problems, using the categories of democracy indexes,
researchers are able to make concepts measurable for testing. The three category label, “not free”
can apply to autocracies, “partly free” can refer to transitioning states, and “free” to democracies.
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To say a “free” state is fully or permanently consolidated is too broad for the purposes here. It can
mean that the state could be on a path toward consolidation as I defined above. Democracy is
expected to be durable. The goal of the research here is not to test the relationship between aid and
complete consolidation where optimal governance permanently endures. Rather, the relationship
between aid and positive transitions are what matters. Positive transitions pave the way for the
legitimization of democratic ideals and the abandonment of violence as a means for change. To
research iron clad consolidation (if such a thing exists), or even attempting to identify when this
specifically took place (year 1 or year 5 or year 20), is a subject to tackle another day.
In recent democracy scholarship, the “democratic peace” has become popular among
theorists. According to Ray (2003), the idea proposes that the likelihood of two democratic states
engaging in conflict is less probable than that of two states which are not. Followed logically, if
more countries were to adopt democracy as a basis for their government, the prospect of a peaceful
global system would be amplified. From an American policymaker’s viewpoint, this should be
highly desirable since more pacific polities enhances American national security through global
stability. Normatively, people living under free and responsive governments is part of the value
system the United States has committed to dispersing.
The theory appeared to have had some influence in the George W. Bush administration. In
response to the September 11 attacks, the United States launched military strikes against the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Fifteen months later, the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was
targeted. At one press conference alongside British PM Tony Blair, the president recited the main
tenant of the “democratic peace” to explain his Middle Eastern policy: “democracies don’t go to
war with each other” he remarked (White House, 2004). A free Afghanistan and Iraq would
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theoretically be a more peaceful Afghanistan and Iraq. Their example could have a snowball effect
on the Middle East, and their expected success serve as a model for other nations in this volatile
region. Since the invasion, USAID has spent considerable funds to stabilize, rebuild and attempt
to democratize both countries. Between 2004 and 2011, for example, aid data shows about 11
billion dollars of obligations designated for Iraq.
Beyond military might, on January of 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
was established as a way to diplomatically push these pacifying policies. MCC is an independent
foreign assistance agency that implements a more selective form of aid to partner countries (MCC,
2016).

Their primary objectives are poverty reduction and health care enhancements to

impoverished countries. Their ambitious goals were created not just to improve the conditions of
people across troublesome regions, but to disincline vulnerable populations from embracing
terrorist and anti-democratic groups (Radelet, 2003). This came in addition to the work already
undertaken by USAID. MCC’s development also marked an increase in aid funds since the end of
the Cold War. Perhaps more importantly, it signaled the United States was invested, literally, in
the development of institutions that gave societies a greater stake in their governments.
The linkages here become clearer. Democracy results in greater security making it a goal
of American foreign policy. Foreign assistance, being associated with such policy actions, should
then be positively associated to the nurturing of democracy. This is not simply an assumption made
here, it is an explicitly stated purpose of aid outlays (USAID 2016; MCC 2016). How foreign
support is structured, allocated, and conducive toward this goal, becomes an important question.
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2.2

American Aid and Multilateral Sources
There are two primary sources of aid available to study for researchers. The first and most

often invoked in the literature is multilateral assistance from international organizations. These
groups are funded by a variety of donor nations across the world. The second source of aid is
bilateral, or country to country disbursements. Broadly speaking, assistance may come in one of
two forms, economic or military. Economic aid is typically provided to expand country growth,
development or improvements in governance and living conditions. Military assistance,
meanwhile, may shore up the security forces of the recipient state, although, it is less common
overall.
Generally, most outlays from international organizations are considered to be economic.
OECD, the Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development, is a major world body
involved in the promotion of growth and governance across the globe. OECD was initially
established in 1948 with the purpose of helping to implement Secretary Marshall’s plan (OECD,
2016). Over time it has become a unifying institution to provide aid to poverty stricken nations
and those on the path toward economic development via multilateral coordination. Through data
collection, analysis, and academic style peer review, OECD attempts to make informed decisions
on who and when to provide monies to states (OECD, 2016). According to Schraeder, Hook and
Taylor (1998) when multiple donors provide assistance, it is delivered to politically stable and
economically well run states.
Bilateral aid may have different standards and purposes than that of multilateral assistance,
however. Alesina and Dollar (2000) posit that the study of multilateral and bilateral aid are two
distinctive topics which should not be explained together. While the former is useful to look at for
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policy coordination among contributing countries, the latter provides insights to the foreign policy
concerns of one donor nation in particular. In their report, Alesina and Dollar (2000) point out
that France does not look much at the democratic values of a recipient and pay closer attention to
former colonies. Germany and Japan look at democracy values more closely, but only marginally
so. One of their major observations is that being a colony and UN voting patterns are more
explanatory of aid donations than any other political component. While it is possible nation to
nation aid flows may be designed for similar purposes as multilateral assistance, wealthier
countries like the United States have an added ability to aid in a military capacity to particular
states. Additionally, dyadic aid need not be coordinated or related to the concerns of other donors.
Indeed, when analyzing two nation relationships, the interactions vary in surprising ways.
Cumulatively, assistance funding is allocated to what should be more worthwhile sources.
Independent of one another, though, the transactions have more complex sticking points.
In the United States, the Marshall Plan was the first step toward the institutionalization of
a durable foreign aid program. President John F. Kennedy oversaw the birth of USAID in the 60’s
with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (USAID, 2016). The Peace Corps, a staple
of American generosity and goodwill, also came about under the guidance of the Kennedy
administration and today works alongside USAID on humanitarian projects. It was the first time
assistance fell under the authority of one bureaucracy and separate from OECD. Aid obligations
are required to be reported, per congressional mandate, for all distributions dating back to 1946.
The report is published yearly, titled specifically, the US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations
and Loan Authorizations book, or in bureaucratic parlance, the Greenbook. The Greenbook is the
primary data source this project will use for its analysis.
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Like any other nation, the United States may also use assistance funds to address their
policy and strategic priorities. Aid can go to several sources such as directly to a country
government, local organizations, or other NGO’s (non-government organizations). When relations
between the US and the recipient are on good terms, grants and loans can be provided to the central
authority directly. This direct distribution could have conditionality placed on it and seek out a
policy concession from that state. Such concessions may be related to policy objectives USAID
lists as top priorities. Those include, economic growth and trade, education, environment and
global climate change, gender equality, and as for the variables of interest here, democracy, human
rights and governance.
While these goals are divided by USAID, it may be justified to include them all as being
conducive to democracy, the subject of interest here. Goldsmith (2001) poses the sensible idea that
a healthier and better educated peoples make for a more robust and engaged citizenry. Graham and
O’Hanlon (1997) writing about economic growth, emphasize growth’s importance in
accomplishing broader societal goals. The overall objectives set up by the agency promote a better
quality of life and economic welfare, both of which may be required to achieve stability (Savun
and Tirone 2012). Like stability, a healthy democracy may need good educational programs, for
example, to survive and consolidate. Despite the demarcation of the programs themselves, it is
possible their accumulated success gives the likelihood of democratic improvements a boost.
Another example of strategy related to governance, are funds sent to nations where there
is no direct diplomatic contact. At times, money or goods are distributed to friendly citizens
harboring democratic desires in undemocratic regimes. A prime example is Iran. Funds can be
found officially on the books directed toward that country, but they are not provided to the
leadership. In the Iran case, the state department lists their foreign assistance as intended to provide
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“Iranian citizens with the tools and training necessary to advocate for their interests, protect
citizens’ rights and to communicate securely and freely with each other and the outside world”
(State Department, 2016). Similar situations can be found for other unfriendly foes such as North
Korea. Regardless of assistance sources, forms, or purported goals, its effectiveness is subject
scrutiny.

2.3

Efficacy
To formulate viable hypotheses about American assistance and its relationship to

democratic diffusion, it is useful to review the existing literature’s conclusions on efficacy overall.
Most of the research focuses primarily on two dependent variables, economic growth and conflict
prevention and mitigation (Savun and Tirone 2012; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Hoeffler
2002; Girod 2012). Comparatively, the democracy and aid tandem is under studied, especially if
it is limited to the US perspective. The aforementioned authors look at democracy, but only as a
control for their models. While their topics of interest are somewhat different from the one here,
their conclusions serve as a good baseline for what to expect. Just as importantly, a robust overview
provides arguments in favor of and against aid, as well as the logic behind them.
Since the 1950’s when aid became a typical policy action following WWII, early critics
voiced opposition. Many took the stance that assistance simply prolonged the life of autocracies
and dictatorships that mistreat their people (Bauer 1972; Friedman 1958). In contrast, by USAID
accounts, there has been significant progress made in the attainment of aid’s global goals. Skeptical
researchers and politicians today continue question that conclusion. A considerably large faction
takes the viewpoint foreign aid is a purposeless and wasteful endeavor. Senator Rand Paul wrote
that the debate reminded him of what “a Soviet ambassador once admitted about Syria: “they take
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everything from us, except advice.” On Pakistan, Paul continued that they “cash our checks, but
they laugh at us” (Paul 2016). Countering this pessimism, proponents consider these programs to
be well-grounded policy that must be maintained. Senator Marco Rubio remarked in 2013 that
“the decisive use of diplomacy, foreign assistance and economic power are the most effective ways
to achieve our interests and stop problems before they spiral into crises." (Mishak 2013).
This scholarly and political clash is the consequence of extremely mixed results and
perceptions. To this point, Radelet (2003) argues a simple, although non-empirical explanation for
why there is pessimism among policymakers. Radelet suspects the bad news surrounding aid often
overshadows the positive strides it does make, the negative overrides the positive. In the academic
realm, though, there exists empirical evidence supporting these pessimistic positions. Knack’s
(2004) evaluative work covering a 25-year time span from 1975 to 2000 reports no benefit to
disbursements on economic growth. He adds an estimation from 1990 to 2000, accounting for the
end of the Cold War to investigate potential timing differences, and finds none. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) reports aid does not result in the eventual pursuit “good” macroeconomic policies
by receiving nations. In direct opposition to these findings, though, Collier and Hoeffler (2002)
report assistance funds actually do promote growth. This is in addition to the conflict mitigating
properties they find aid to have, as well. Easterly (2006), perhaps the most critical of skeptics,
condemns aid outright. For Easterly, the fungibility factor inherent in disbursements cannot be
accounted for effectively by providers. A common conclusion is that often times, funds are either
re-directed for the regime’s interests, wasted or misspent.
Girod (2012) finds a more uplifting result, reporting aid to be fruitful when provided to
post conflict states that have few resource rents and whose strategic importance is low to the donor.
Girod’s innovative study generates the “non-strategic desperation hypothesis”. The logic is that
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these countries, in their pursuit of survival, will acquiesce to reform and development demands
due to their reliance on external assistance. Using infant mortality rates as a proxy for development,
the results show a $10 per capita increase to these states reduces infant deaths by about 2%. On
the other hand, aid does not help conditionality when the state has natural resources or is important
in some form or another to the donor. The caveat of natural resources supports the theory that oil
rich countries often times suffer from a resource “curse” (Ross 2001). This suggests that natural
commodities tend to bog down good governance in countries and keep in power autocratic
regimes.
In the vein of recipient importance and economic development, many studies raise
concerns about this potential strategy component. Some propose that when it comes to pushing
good economic policy or development, positive progress will always take a backseat to the donor
interests (Graham and O’Hanlon 1997). They further add that countries receiving greater amounts
of aid do not grow any quicker than those receiving less. This implies that the fiscal welfare of the
recipient is only of peripheral concern for the donor if a political interaction of some sort is present.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) make use of Bueno de Mesquita et al’s (2003)
selectorate theory (which quantified the winning coalition concept in the first place) to look at both
strategy and conditionality. They find aid given to rulers of small winning coalitions is compatible
with policy concessions asked for by the donor. While this is useful for the provider, it can be
harmful to the recipient’s citizenry since unearned income can prop up a ruling class through
corrupt practices. If the winning coalition size is greater, then there is less likely to be enough
resources to doll out privately. To solve the issue, public goods are then produced. This is similar
to the reasoning for why democracies provide broad services, it appeases a greater number of
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people at a cheaper cost. Aid given to those dependent on a large winning coalition can at least
provide some relief for the non-elite members of that society.
Bearce and Tirone (2010), positing aid is useful for growth if strategy is unimportant, add
that this positive relationship is only visible after 1990, contrary to the finding in Knack (2004).
Once the Cold War came to an end, the conditionality of good economic policy in exchange for
assistance funding was said to be more pronounced. A widely accepted viewpoint for why this was
is that after the collapse of the URRS, strategic needs of western donors were far lessened. No
longer did countries like the US need to associate with dictatorial regimes that were human rights
abusers purely for strategy (Meernik, Krueger, and, Poe 1998). The idea that time delineations
were as salient to distinguish, re-appear often across more recent assistance studies.
In one of the few contributions with respect to the US and aid, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe
(1998) find the passing of the Cold War created a systemic environment where strategic aims
declined, while more ideological aims rose. When specifically looking at US foreign assistance,
they observe that the neediest of countries received increasing portions of the aid budget, while
the most autocratic ones had their aid reduced. Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson (2007) examine
aid designed specifically for the promotion of democracy, constructing their dataset from USAID,
similarly to what is done here. They conclude that “democratic governance” expenditures do result
in a “significant, albeit modest impact” on democracy (Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2003,
435). They add that democratic assistance targets specific agents of society which are better suited
to bring about changes in the short term. Unfortunately, not many works analyze US aid and their
impact on the promotion of democracy. The last two studies stand out in their uniqueness. There
are, however, some examinations about assistance and democracy movements more broadly.
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Goldsmith (2001) analyzes progress made in Africa from the 1970’s to the 1990’s using
lagged ODA data and the Freedom House index. His study provided a tepid endorsement of aid
with results finding it to be a small net plus for both democratic and economic improvements.
Building on that research, Dunning (2004) seeks to further explain the situation in the continent
with a key, temporal twist. Dunning argues that the reason aid only had a marginal impact the first
time around in Goldsmith was because there was no differentiation between Cold War and postCold War periods. Once the adjustment is included, the relationship becomes positive and clearer.
Aid success and the time frames which it is given may be related, as other studies also showed
(Bearce and Tirone 2010; Meernik, Krueger, and, Poe 1998).
Starr and Lindborg (2003) take up the time testing suggestion in a critical evaluation of
democratic progress. They separate multiple periods and use hazard ratios to gauge the
probabilities of movements toward and away from democracy. In the first 1974 to 1988
observation, the probability of a “not free” country moving to the “partly free” or “free” condition
is higher than the probabilities of seeing the inverse. Their most fascinating finding comes during
the 1989- 1996 period. In it, their analysis suggests the probabilities of a “not free” country moving
to “free” are the same as a “free” country moving to “not free”. This is odd since the conventional
wisdom may lead one to believe that during the 1990’s states would be far less likely to regress
democratically. They posit that because the system shifted so rapidly, countries that improved
democratically from this point were less stable and thus, more likely to backslide. Democracy
improvements are more likely to happen over longer periods of time, in the evolutionary method.
In democracy literature, the development of political institutions is seen as key to eventual
consolidation (Dahl, 1971). Is it possible that aid actually acts as a roadblock to institutional wellbeing? Djankov et. al, (2008) notes that foreign money contributes to institutional decline by
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increasing income available to a country’s leadership. In turn, this allows for an added capacity to
reduce representativeness through the exclusion of rival, political actors. If aid actually works, it
can only work if the institutional foundation of the recipient is already strong, creating needed
pressure for that money to be used appropriately (Wright and Winters 2010). This creates a paradox
of sorts. Funds are supposed to help foster good political structures, yet, according to this research,
it actually weakens them unless the structures are already strong in the first place.
Similarly, the “perversity thesis” argument posits a similar conundrum. This is the belief
that prompting a group of people to move in one direction will actually cause them to move in the
opposite way (Goldsmith 2001). This theory parallels Starr and Lindborg’s (2003) idea that states
may develop a more durable democracy when the movement toward freedom progresses in more
evolutionary terms. If true, then democracy simply cannot be exported or pursued until the people
in question decide they want it. Cynics may pose the obvious question, why bother? Assistance in
times of natural disaster may be fine to provide, but for the accomplishment of policy goals, aid
could be better spent.
An important question those unfamiliar with assistance studies may ask is, why there are
such variances in outcomes? A few reasons are possible. First, the development of terminology is
challenging to coalesce around, like the democracy discussion indicated earlier. Girod (2012) for
example puts together a neat, four attribute definition for the “strategic” value of one state for
another. While well developed for his purposes, not every researcher would agree with the method.
Constructing better terms is always positive if the researcher feels more robust outcomes will
prevail with superior explanatory power. This practice, however, has bogged down the literature
on aid and created a puzzle of its own. Time periods, democracy measures, appropriate lags to
account for endogeneity in the model specifications all seem to be the product of their researcher,
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not always building around previously used frameworks. Wright (2009), on aid and
democratization, proposes that a reason for such inconsistency in the results is a symptom of
different modeling processes and cross sectional regressions failing to account for time.
These studies do demonstrate a few important things. First, because results are so varied, a
narrow approach to learning about aid functionality should be adopted. Specifically, how is aid
used by nations bilaterally as an extension of their foreign policy? Secondly, time periods matter
and the donor’s position and perception of the security in the world system can help researchers
answer aid questions. Thirdly, anything too broad or too ambitious will only generate contradictory
outcomes. If that pattern continues, there may ultimately not be any generalizable knowledge to
acquire. Here, the goal is to narrow the focus on democracy and the efforts of one country, the
United States. By assessing how aid interacts with democratic promotion, inferences can be made
about the greater goals of foreign policy such as national security. Additionally, it highlights the
limits of moralistic desires like the spread of good governance.

2.4

Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis
What theoretical foundations in the international relations literature can help account for

what is seen and known so far? We know foreign aid is linked to foreign policy and that foreign
policy is, likewise, linked to national security. We also know that aid is designed to achieve
specific goals, and outcomes are often of questionable quality. Finally, we are aware that who the
donor and recipient are is important in determining who gets bilateral aid and how much. Given
this set of concrete facts (about as concrete as the literature provides), what framework of
international relations is the most useful for the development of falsifiable hypotheses? More to
the point of this research, which is best suited to describe and explain foreign aid from the
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American perspective? One of the classic and most hotly debated constructs, political realism, is
one place to start.
In 1948, Hans Morgenthau published his influential work titled “Politics Among Nations.”
The book took a “realist” viewpoint about state behavior and its role in international relations.
Political realism views human attitudes in a more primitive sense, where the stakes are high and
the struggle for survival is constant. This human condition naturally transfers over to politics.
Political power is emphasized and thought of as a man’s ability to control the actions and mind of
another (Morgenthau 1948). Because the possibility of conflict is never-ending, states are said to
be anticipatory toward foreign dangers and constantly on alert. Coming off WWII, it should not
come as a surprise why his work gained prominence given the negative assumptions it made of
state behavior. In realist thought, countries are predatory and seek domination and power
(Mearsheimer 2001).
There are three core components of realism according to Mearsheimer (2001). First, states
are the primary units of analysis. Second, states have power consideration at the forefront of their
thinking. Conflict is fueled by competition and cooperation may occur on occasion, but is still
mired by suspicion. Third, the behavior of states is conditioned by systemic forces, meaning
external influences that are out their control dictate foreign policy. Domestic considerations are
not explanatory to their behavior in the international arena. Realism is then power driven, and
states act as singular units to achieve their goals.
Indeed, scholars that identify with this school are often accused of being pessimists about
cooperation, peace and human nature, generally. These accusations have merit, but so do realist
viewpoints. A passing glance at human history over the past century alone identifies numerous
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wars with millions of lives lost. The prospect of goodwill is not completely voided, however. For
Morgenthau (1948) morality is recognized and can be possible in politics. That is a fine thing to
have. A problem emerges, however, when morality clashes with political success. One particular
excerpt from “Power Among Nations” explains this best:
“The individual may say to himself, “fiat Justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even
if the world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care…
while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the
state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of
successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival” (Morgenthau,
1948, 10).`
In its purest formulation, realism notes that morality and the seeking of justice, while laudable, is
always secondary to political achievement. This fact is more pronounced when that achievement
it linked to a state’s security.
The employment of realist tenants in theory development of American foreign policy can
be equally praised or criticized, however. First, the most ardent realist may argue that fully
adopting these principles accurately depicts the true nature of American behavior in the world
system. In other words, that the notion there is some genuine commitment to the spread of
democracy is mistaken, that policies are actually pursued for the purpose of political achievement,
as Morgenthau might put it. On the other hand, a critic of realism may point out that the Hobbesian
bedrock of its foundation is too rigid and ignores visible episodes of cooperation and alliance.
Moravcsik (2003, 190) argues that most modern realist scholars have altered concepts of the realist
school and “water down” primary assumptions to fit these realities. He continues that “states
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represent some subset of domestic society, whose weighted preferences constitute the underlying
goals that rational state officials pursue via foreign policy” (Moravcsik 2003, 163). This last point
indicates that beyond the theoretical world, in reality, domestic groups have some influence on
foreign policy action, an argument also glossed over in realism.
It is not within the scope of this paper to fully argue all the merits of any research program
in the international relations field. The topics discussed above, however, do make key points that
can contribute to the formulation of a theory of foreign policy for the United States. Both realist
proponents and opponents make valid points about how decisions are made in real world
circumstances. Alliances do exits, domestic groups do matter, and security concerns can become
a top priority at any moment and take precedence over all other matters. While this meshing of
theory is not ideal, the approach is conducive to eliminating the ideological-like entrenchment of
international relations scholars which limits the assumptions a theory can make. This is necessary
because the United States appears to be a unique agglomeration of realist and idealist behavior.
The hierarchical theory of foreign policy to be presented borrows two key points from
liberal minded scholars like Moravcsik and classical realists like Morgenthau. The first is that
policymakers are genuinely interested in the promotion of democratic ideals. The reasons are
twofold. First, because there exists a human component of morality, and second, because it may
simultaneously advance the international security situation of the United States. This is more in
line with liberalist thought process. The second point puts forth that while the diffusion of virtuous
values is preferred, when these objectives interfere or run contrary to important security concerns,
policies that ensure the safety of the state will be prioritized. This is more in line with the realist
thought process. The following chapter discusses this theory in-depth. Its main goal is to help
explain American foreign policy maneuvers, how foreign aid is linked to policy, and how foreign
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aid can be a useful empirical instrument. Ideally, it should also provide additional insights into
how decision makers arrive at seemingly contradictory decisions and how they choose to prioritize
one set of goals versus another.
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Chapter 3: Theory

3.1

American Foreign Policy Dynamics
A New York Times article recently made interesting observations about the tacit American

support of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. Assad has ruled the Arab republic since 2000 and
recently presided over a brutal civil war. In 2013, the regime engaged in the use of sarin gas against
opposition forces, resulting in the deaths of fourteen hundred men, women and children. A year
prior, President Barack Obama spoke of a “red line” Assad would not get away with crossing, the
use of weapons of mass destruction. Sarin nerve agents, with their ability to paralyze the lungs
until death, certainly fits that bill. Regime change never materialized, however. In a dramatic shift,
not only did the United States seem to back off its demand Assad step down, it has worked
alongside the Syrian air force against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereafter ISIS), arguably
the world’s preeminent terrorist organization.
Sanger (2016) points out that this policy reversal is interpreted by Assad’s surrogates (and
enemies) that the cost of removing him from power is simply too high. If Assad fell, the door
would be open for extremist groups like ISIS to cause havoc and gain strength. While diplomatic
criticism of Assad is still visible, no steps toward his removal have been taken by the president or
pushed for by the lawmakers. Congress never aggressively sought an authorization for use of force
against Syria after an impromptu disarmament deal was struck with Assad’s Russian allies. The
United States collaborators against Assad, a moderate opposition group called the Free Syrian
Army, has struggled to make tangible gains against the regime.
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Certainly the Syrian situation is one of the most delicate and politically complex in the
world. This episode, though, illustrates three key reflections. First, American rhetoric about
democracy appears genuine. The president and the congress both seem to be on the same page
about desiring good governance in the world. Their disdain of Assad and his Russian backers lend
credence to this even if their actions seem counterintuitive. Secondly, the security concerns
prompted by the rise of ISIS has limited the menu of options for American leadership. The
constraint is evident if, as the New York Times article suggests, the maintenance of a murderous
regime is preferable to instability and potential nurturing of extremist terror actors. Lastly,
domestic ambiguity has reigned in the degree of hawkishness exhibited by elected American
representatives. A costly Iraq adventure could well have made the American people suspicious
about another military engagement. If that is the case, one would expect policymakers who live
and die politically at the ballot box to be more peace oriented. Congressional members may be
reserved about allowing military involvement in a place like Syria even if they personally feel
force is needed. Opposition for military action against Assad came from both sides of the aisle, so
it is not a wholly partisan issue.
Looking at the bigger picture, is the Syrian experience indicative of what American foreign
policy preferences have become since 9/11? Is the terrorist threat engendering an attitude of
indifference toward democratic promotion and a veiled acceptance of craven regimes? If true, then
the prospects for another democratic renaissance are dim. In the Cold War, the need to suppress
communist expansion often found the United States partnering with repressive leaders. In 1949,
Chinese communist forces lead by Mao Zedong overthrew the American friendly dictator Chiang
Kai Shek. Chiang’s troops fled to Taiwan and operated a government in exile, one lacking any
meaningful democratic characteristics. Nevertheless, for almost three decades, the American
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position was that Chiang’s government was the true China and protected the island from the
mainland. The disdain for Chiang was evident by key military figures dating back to WWII.
General Stillwell, a Chiang advisor at the time, once described the nationalist as “an ignorant,
illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch" (Fenby 2004).
After the USSR came apart, the prevailing wisdom posited that American support for
foreign nations would be conditional upon political reform. With the threat of the Soviets and
communism gone, there seemed little reason to further engage autocratic states. American backing
needed to be linked to meaningful governmental change or improvements. As multiple scholars
above have reported, the difference in time periods was in fact important (Starr and Lindborg 2003;
Dunning 2004). This welcomed transformation would be an ephemeral moment, however, with
the emergence of Al-Qaeda and their terrorist partners as credible threats to homeland security. I
argue that this new circumstance has reverted US foreign policy to one similar to that of the Cold
War. The perceived magnitude of this menace is also likely enhanced by the fact that civilians are
often targeted and sympathizers difficult to identify. What can be expected out of American foreign
policy after these newfound changes and what impacts can be predicted?
To be sure, terrorism and its threat have always existed. The World Trade Center was
bombed in 1993, the Alfred P. Murrah building in 1995, and a marine barrack in Beirut in 1983.
There were major differences from then and now, however. The first Trade Center bombing was
not particularly successful in terms of its intent to topple the towers and cause mass casualties. The
Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh was homegrown terrorism related to the bomber’s
perception of a tyrannical government and a need to attack it. The Beirut bombings targeted
military forces, not American civilians outright. It was not until airliners were used as weapons on
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American soil that it became a top priority despite the earlier events. George W. Bush’s agenda at
the onset of his presidency appeared more oriented towards domestic concerns. After the attacks,
that dramatically changed and, I argue, so did foreign policy maneuvers.

3.2

Hierarchical System of American Foreign Policy
American foreign policy, I feel, can be predicted by comparing current security goals

versus general long term policy goals and their correlation to each other. Generally, long term
goals will tend to be normative in nature such as the promotion of democracy, human rights, or
assisting in the development of strong, political institutions. These pursuits are not achievable
immediately, naturally take time to develop, and can span across many years. The successful
diffusion of accountable and responsive governments should lead to a more stable world system
even in the presence of anarchy. This is a major benefit to a world power such as the United States
through the enhancement of its overall security. On a human level, it is also understandable how
bringing about improvements in people’s lives can be morally fulfilling.
In some cases, immediate security needs interfere or run contrary to those drawn out
objectives. When this is the case the more pressing concerns are, and should be prioritized. As a
realist would have it, issues of survival and challenges to relative power positions must be handled
swiftly. If a security concern reaches a certain pivot point and these moral aims somehow conflict,
the latter will be put on hold indefinitely. These actions may include support for rebel groups, or
the shoring up of autocrats like Chiang Kai Shek. In some cases, normative objectives may be
abandoned altogether if no acceptable resolution to a problem is on the horizon.
The perception of such threats and the general state of American national security is filtered
through domestic actors. The president, members of congress and security agencies gauge the
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systemic risks at different points in time to determine policy actions. These evaluations result in
two types of security classifications, heightened security periods, or lowered security periods.
During lowered security epochs, long term goals can be sought out more comfortably with
diminished risks and additional latitude to spread American influence. During the heightened eras,
whatever is occurring that is so salient will be prioritized and treated as necessary.
Reactions to dangers may come in the form of military engagement, for example, but it
does not need to be. Procurement of allies for balancing or to confront an enemy on our behalf is
possible, alongside any number of options presented given current power capabilities. In exploring
the available set of reactions, it is conceivable some of the directives adopted during a heightened
security period may be detrimental to the outcomes of morally desirable goals. This is not meant
to be a criticism or a repudiation, in fact, this indifferent behavior is actually expected. Realism
does not tend to grapple with what is “right” or “wrong”. What is “right” is whatever is necessary
to ensure the maintenance of the state and protect those living under its sovereignty. If well
intentioned objectives must be set aside, they will be. Long and short term aims can go hand in
hand, they need not be mutually exclusive. When there is friction between them, though, the
immediate problem will be prioritized over drawn out benefits that can only be conceptualized in
an abstract way.
American foreign policy goals are then hierarchical in nature. Preference ordering is
dependent upon the interpretations of elected officials and foreign policy specialists. When
national security concerns are relatively low; democracy, for example, can be placed at the top of
the foreign policy pyramid. Such a situation would be the post-Cold War years with the fall of the
Soviets and communism mostly rejected. The 1990’s provided the United States with a historic
opportunity to promote good governance and open markets since these liberalizing policies
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appeared to have become the only acceptable option. When national security concerns are high, if
these well intentioned objectives are impediments to American interests, they will drop to the
bottom of the pyramid. The height of the Cold War fits this last description. During this time, the
United States sought clients in every world region with only a distant view of their domestic
political behaviors (Ake 1996).
Given these assumptions, studying the use of American assistance becomes interesting
because it is a tool reflective of American power capacity. Not every country, even major powers,
have the resources to provide millions in aid to fulfill their foreign policy concerns. Decision
makers can use aid for humanitarian reasons or to help develop good political institutions in
transitioning states. It can also be expended to prop up regimes, both democratic and undemocratic.
Assistance can then be linked to strategy and by extension to American national security. Because
of this relationship, aid can be considered a visible and measurable component of foreign policy
dating back to the post World War II era.
The data available through agencies like USAID are useful for investigating goals and
motivations during different moments of American history, which is a crucial part of this
argument. If the theory outlined above has standing, it should be empirical in an analysis of aid
and democracy, considered to be a long term goal. This association should mirror the dynamic of
American foreign policy hierarchy. During a heightened security period, American assistance
should be negatively associated with democracy. During a lowered security period, aid
disbursement should be positively associated.
In high security settings, aid may be used to keep autocratic rulers in power to maintain
stability, thereby bogging down democracy. While it may also be provided to democratic actors
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within those regimes, due to opposing security pursuits, it could render that aid ineffective.
Additionally, the general need to generate alliances or cooperation from world partners diminishes
the conditionality placed on aid. These partners can often include autocracies with no desire to
liberalize their polity unless sufficiently pressed to do so. Being aware of our need for their support
in heightened security periods, aid provided to them would not help advance good governance.
Civil and human rights violations may take place, but there is no sanction for the US to credible
threaten to cause a change in their client’s behavior. Violations may be overlooked and accepted
as unfortunate occurrences resulting from greater needs or the greater good. Such infractions could
even be committed to achieve the requested American security policy concessions. Aid would, as
the literature suggests, feed winning coalitions to keep a particular leader in power and enrich their
coffers. American options are hamstrung. Leverage is held over the donor leading to a half-hearted
push for political change and a half-hearted, if any, attempt to implement it by the recipient. That
scenario is undoubtedly toxic for democratic progress since it will either stall out or end.
This gloomy condition is juxtaposed to that of lowered security period. In such episodes,
aid should have the ability to induce positive responses from the recipient state. Money given out
in these periods should have a stronger effect if the United States is fully committed to observing
democratic reforms. The strings attached to funds, under those conditions, are sturdier and pressure
can be exerted more forcefully on clients. An undemocratic regime or transitioning state may
covet, or simply need, those funds that they will begin or accelerate a process of liberalization.
Middling countries that dabble with democracy but drag their feet, would not be as able to stall
out political reforms.
This reasoning is similar to that of Girod (2012) and the “non-strategic desperation
hypothesis”. Recall the hypothesis opines recipient need and low strategic value on the part of the
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donor are important to better developmental outcomes. The same assumption is made here, but
instead of development, the variable of concern is democracy. More simply, when security
concerns are relatively low, aggressive pushes for reform by the United States can be made and
are more likely to yield results. The added bonus of being in the good graces of the country in
charge of the world’s most powerful military is not a bad thing for a recipient, either.
What about aid granted to NGO’s or other democratic actors working on the ground of a
country? The assistance provided here is also susceptible to the temporal dynamics of the
international system. Indeed, these groups are genuinely reform minded and actively pursue
changes as best they can. But these efforts can be undermined by simultaneous policies of indirect
support for a despotic regime in a high security atmosphere. This is expected to occur when the
US may, for example, have a strong desire to put down certain insurgents residing in the country
in question. In the Cold War, such groups included communist guerrilla fighters and post 9/11,
these may be terrorist insurgents like Al-Qaeda, al-Nusra or ISIS. Perhaps the stability provided
by a dictator is preferred to the uncertainty that comes after said dictator. In their work on aid,
Azam and Thelen (2010) find it to be useful at reducing terrorism. While this is welcomed news
security-wise, less terrorism does not necessarily mean increasing political liberties.
To revisit the Syrian example, monetary assistance is not directly provided to the Assad
regime. Conditionality and pressure to a central authority is not a valid conclusion to make.
Nevertheless, millions of dollars are given to non-state actors, and friendly groups on the ground.
Apart from humanitarian and refugee aid, according to the US bilateral relations sheet at the State
Department, the US also “support the Syrian people’s aspirations for a democratic, inclusive, and
unified Syria and are providing direct, non-lethal support to the moderate Syrian opposition” (State
2016). Aid is given to those believed to have reform minded intentions. At the same time, though,
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there exists indirect support for Assad when calls for his removal are tamped down or coordination
is made with his forces to fight a common terrorist enemy. In 2015, a senior Western diplomat
described the situation as the US and its Western allies needing to pick sides. The options are
between “the black flags and Damascus” and that the choice will need to be Assad (Baker, 2015).
If Syria is indicative of other difficult choices to be made in other parts of the world, is aid
in the age of the war on terror becoming meaningless with respect to pushes for democracy and
reforms? By providing aid for “aspirations for democracy” while simultaneously backing off
regime change, this assistance disbursement to Syria is probably not an effective vehicle for
democratic improvement. While it signals the goals itself is desirable and not abandoned, the
change it will substantively bring is minimal, at least in the short term. The assumption of this
theory would be that change will not be likely to occur at all until the system environment reverts
to one of lowered security. Provisions of aid to these democratic proponents may appear to be a
waste if the US knows their ability to bring change is small. However, it is possible to view it as a
sort of priming, the laying of a groundwork for eventual political change. Keep in mind an
assumption of this theory is that policymakers genuinely want to bring about more democracy.
This democratic priming through assistance may the first step towards those goals.
Yet another headache for policymakers concerns what can be done when democratic
change is occurring in a manner detrimental to American interests. If national security is of major
concern, a change in a friendly democratic or undemocratic regime brings about unwanted
uncertainty. How would the collapse of an undemocratic regime be hurtful to American security
if democracy is said to generally strengthen it? The answer is simply that the incoming,
legitimately elected administration, may harbor reservations about an American alliance. Not all
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fairly elected governments have a favorable view of the United States. If these new actors risk
damaging an important American security strategy, a preference may be to keep an autocratic
regime intact. Foreign aid could be used to prop up the incumbent ruler and prevent him or her
from collapse. A worsening in the levels of democracy is not expected, but its positive movement
would be stalled or kept the same.
The Nicaraguan affair of the 1980’s is a particularly interesting example of this type of
dynamic. At the time, the Sandinistas had overthrown Anastasio Somoza, the last ruler of the so
called Somoza dynasty. In 1984, the junta was democratically elected by a wide margin after some
political opponents boycotted elections. Of concern to the US was that the Sandinistas were a left
wing revolutionary group and the Reagan administration was weary of having them in power.
Reagan’s advisors advocated a policy of support for the Contras, an opposition group framed as
being democratic revolutionaries. The Contras, however, were complicit in human rights abuses,
so much so that the Boland amendment was passed by Congress to restrict aid to the group, twice.
The Iran-Contra affair ensued, a money funneling scheme to support the rebels via a surplus
income of arms sales to the Iranians (which itself was prohibited by an embargo). Eventually, aid
to the Contras resumed through congressional approval in the summer of 1986.
The history of the United States and Nicaragua in the 1980’s highlights the type of situation
where supporting democracy is not conducive to security and, despite its generally normative
preference, its achievement can be set aside. Reagan’s characterization of the Contra’s as
democratic proponents notwithstanding, their operations against the Sandinistas were antidemocratic themselves. The president’s administration had two choices: tolerate the
democratically elected but ideologically unappealing Sandinistas, or support the rebels against
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them. Reagan opted for the rebels while congress explicitly opposed such support in the form of
military aid. This is important because it demonstrates that foreign policy decisions are filtered
through a state’s inner workings.
More salient for this analysis of aid and democracy, how the events occur is captured in
data. US funds for Nicaragua, according to USAID, are blank for the years of 1985 to 1987 as a
result of the complete congressional restrictions. They resume in the following year, aid year 1988
which runs from October of 1987 to September of 1988. This is from the congress’ decision to
provide allocations to Nicaragua once again. The aid data, then, is reflective of American foreign
policy in the region. While this is just one historical analysis, it lends credibility to the assumption
that aid is not good for democratic growth during a high security period.
This case also provides a critique about the scope and limitations of quantitative analysis
which I will present. For the Nicaraguan episode, USAID fails to account for Iran-Contra since
those funds were off the books. The President’s advisor actions differed from the American foreign
policy agreed upon by congress and, officially, by President Reagan. An event like Iran-Contra
could offset the positive strides aid disbursements should have. Precise conclusions about aid’s
enervated impact being attributed to covert acts, or something similar, could not be definitively
made, however. Because their presence may be unknown they cannot be statistically modeled in.
As a matter of history, it is just recognized they may exist. This means aid itself could be the cause
of stagnation in improvements, or an unobservable, unknown policy could be affecting its
usefulness. This is not as problematic as one might expect. If covert action or unseen policy effect
is taking place that is detrimental to democracy, it should be captured in the resulting negative or
positive association between aid and democracy. In fact, with respect to the Syrian example, a
current analysis of aid and democracy to that country should not yield positive results for those
42

allocations. This is because the current policy of indirect support is weakening the effects of that
assistance. In other words, security policies that are unaccounted for are inadvertently nested in
the results. Their presence, though, cannot be tangibly observed.
By looking at the significance of foreign aid after 2001, compared to the Cold War and
Post-Cold War eras, inferences can be made about the shifts in foreign policy priorities over time.
This also provides insights into questions made by scholars about conditionality and efficacy in an
age where American concerns are arguably dominated by non-state terror actors. Most of the
literature summarized previously looked at OECD data and multilateral assistance to test
hypotheses. Here, American bilateral aid is investigated because I seek to learn about American
foreign policy patterns, specifically. Like was discussed previously, the goals of a donor to a
recipient directly can be very particular. These can include the strengthening of colonial
relationships, special economic interests, or their own individual security problems. This research
is intentionally narrowed down to better focus on US threat responses and their possibly negative
impact on other goals such as democracy. Aid from multilateral and bilateral realms should be
studied distinctly (Alesina and Dollar 2000).
Beyond the assistance provisions from Western sources, a criticism could be made about
the lack of inclusion of autocratic aid. Countries such as Russia and China also award loans and
grants across the globe. A reasonable assumption to make is that their generosity also comes with
conditionality and is not simply altruistic. In the Cold War, the USSR would counter American
disbursements with their own, creating a situation where both super powers were competing for
influence. In today’s world system this type of competition likely exists, but to what degree is
difficult to assess. Russia’s international objectives of late seem to be expansionist and militaristic
in nature. China appears to be concerned with the procurement of new markets and have little issue
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with the system of government a client has. These offsetting influences may be detrimental to
democracy, as well, and could have an unseen effect on any analysis about American aid. The
problem is that obtaining aid numbers from these countries is difficult to do with any type of
validity. To my knowledge, no scholarly work has been able to include USSR aid during the Cold
War in any statistical model. It is acknowledged that it did exist and assistance was given, although
monetary numerical precision was never reported.
The works of Dunning (2004), Bearce and Tirone (2010), Starr and Lindborg (2003) and
Alesina and Dollar (2000) are the foundations for this work. Specifically, recall Bearce and
Tirone’s focus on aid and development. Their concluding remarks warn that if aid becomes more
useful for military-strategic reasons, it also becomes caustic for development. They continue that
assistance cannot effectively serve the dual purposes of growth and ally recruitment in the war on
terror. Their concerns raise an interesting question about potentially new undercurrents in the 21st
century, concerns that have largely been unexplored. Dunning’s, Starr and Lindborg’s main
emphasize is on commitment credibility, observational time periods and the relationship between
both. Alesina and Dollar stress the differences between multilateral aid and dyadic aid between
two countries.
I have built upon these important concepts and applied them to the United States case of
bilateral aid allocation to argue it is reflective of our base foreign policy. When long term
objectives clash with short term security concerns, the latter will always be prioritized even if it is
at the peril of the former. These threat perceptions are filtered through domestic political actors
who take a realist-like approach to solving the problem at hand. Finally, this pattern should be
expected to repeat itself because a state will value protecting their position in the world system,
their relative power capabilities and security. This research should not only add to the existing
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literature of aid in the Cold War, post-Cold War periods, but also contribute to the study of US
foreign policy dynamics during the war on terror.
Not all outcomes will be the same and aid is not somehow destined to fail if the
environment is composed in a particular way. The ultimate destination or goals of aid can be many
and vary from country to country. An in-depth, qualitative analysis for each observation could be
valuable, but not realistic. The United States provides foreign aid to almost every country on the
planet, so such a detailed research project for one year alone would take a copious amount of time.
The solution is then to take the data on aid available to researchers and examine its significance
toward democracy across different periods of time.
The probabilities of success under certain conditions are what matters. Some countries will
see improvements while others will struggle, that is clear. The question is about how generalizable
the pattern predicted by the theory actually is. The world in which social sciences operates is a
probabilistic one, devoid of any type of natural law. Societies and people, unlike gravity, have a
free will to do as they please even if 99 out of 100 other individuals will behave in a similar way.
Even the most robust results will be vulnerable to outliers. While democracy is just one policy
outcome of many that can be studied, the results here may be a stepping stone toward later analysis
of other objectives given this explanation.

3.3

Hypotheses

With the assumptions now outlined, hypotheses can be generated about the aid-democracy
relationship. The democracy index used is Freedom House. Theirs is a three tier category of “Not
Free” (NF), “Partly Free” (PF) and “Free” (F). A detailed explanation of what go into these ratings
is provided in the following data chapter. The hypotheses are the following:
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H1: During the Cold War period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the not free to the partly free category.
H2: During the Cold War period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the partly free to free category.
H3: During the post-Cold War period, high levels of American increases the likelihood of
a transition from the not free to the partly free category.
H4: During the post-Cold War period, high levels of American aid increase the likelihood
of a transition from the partly free to free category.
H5: During the post 9/11 period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the not free to the partly free category.
H6: During the post 9/11 period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the partly free to free category.
These six core hypotheses separate two heightened security periods (Cold War and post
9/11) from one lowered security period (post-Cold War). The post-Cold War period is expected to
generate the most favorable outcome for democracy when the primary independent variable is aid.
The Cold War era and the post 9/11 era are not expected to be conducive for democracy for the
reasons given above. Both these periods should yield similar results. The following chapter will
cover the statistical method to be used, important data details and control variables that are
included in the model. The analysis and results will also be presented.
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Chapter 4: Data and Methods

4.1

Primary Variables, USAID and Freedom House
The U.S. federal government has a remarkable record keeping process that dates back to

1946 when foreign assistance was handed out to post conflict Europe. The figures, while not exact,
are one of the best measures available for scholars looking to investigate aid. In determining
democratic movement, I employ Freedom House scores since it is one the most widely used and
accepted democracy measures by academics and government entities. Both the aid and democracy
variables are subject to some key nuances.
The numbers presented for foreign assistance are based on the data from the US Overseas
Loans and Grants congressional report, otherwise known as the Greenbook. Based on historical
data, there are four categories available for inspection in the USAID database. These are, economic
obligations, economic disbursements, military obligations, and military disbursements. An
“obligation” as defined by USAID is “a binding agreement that will result in outlays immediately
or in the future”. A “disbursement” are “amounts paid by federal agencies in cash or cash
equivalent during a fiscal year to liquidate obligations”. While disbursement data may appear more
useful as it accounts for actual cash amounts given out during a specific year, those figures only
date back to 2001. Obligations, as noted above, are funds slated to be given “immediately or in the
future”, making it difficult to determine precisely when and how much money was disbursed.
Nevertheless, these obligation numbers are the most precise figures available for years dating back
before technology made more accurate tracking possible. Obligation numbers have been collected
dating back to 1972, the starting point of the analysis. Raw economic and military obligation
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dollars are divided by the population of each country on a given year, as estimated by World Bank
data. This number yields per capita figures for economic and military obligations independently.
Dollar figures are presented in constant 2013 dollars by USAID.
Unfortunately, US government fiscal years do not begin neatly on a January and end on
December. Prior to 1976, fiscal years began July 1st and ended June 30th. So, for example, fiscal
year 1972 ran from July 1st, 1971 to June 30th, 1972 and fiscal year 1973 ran from July 1st, 1972
to June 30th, 1973 and so forth. In 1976, the fiscal year start time was moved to October 1st running
to September 30th as it remains to this day. Due to this temporal shift, 1976 has a special aid year
figure, 1976q, representing aid obligations for the period of July to September of that transitioning
period. This presents a data issue because Freedom House typically begins their observation of
countries on a normal, January to December period. To address this, I use fiscal years 1973-1976
for Freedom House years 1972 to 1975 while year 1976q represents year 1976. Thereafter, fiscal
years match with the Freedom House year respectively since that is the closest both years can be
matched. This was preferable to using fiscal year 1972 for freedom year 1972 since a good portion
of 1971 would be unobserved in the data.
Freedom House democracy scores are coded in a way that matches their three category
conceptualization. Countries are labelled as “not free”, “partly free” and “free”. To determine
under which label each country corresponds to, Freedom House uses a panel of 25 questions posed
to their experts serving as judges. Political rights has 10 questions while civil liberties has 15 with
each one being awarded between 0 and 4 points. Under this framework, the most democratic
countries can score up to 40 points for political rights and 60 points for civil liberties. A 1 to 7
point scale is then matched to both question groupings, where 1 would correspond to countries
scoring toward the top such as a 60 for civil liberties and 40 for political rights. The most
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undemocratic countries whose question points range very low, are attributed a 7. The sum of the
1 to 7 point scales is taken and divided by two, yielding their freedom score. If a country such as
North Korea, for example, scores a 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, their sum would
be 14 and then divided by 2. Their overall freedom score would then be a 7, the “worst of the
worst”, resulting in a “not free” category designation. On the other hand, countries like the United
Kingdom would score two 1’s and be divided by 2 to equal a 1, landing them as “free”. Most cases,
however, do not fall under one extreme or another. Most countries will fall in the middle. To solve
the issue, Freedom House has minimum and maximum value to each category of “free”, “not free”
and an additional “partly free” group. If a country’s final, divided value falls between 1 and 2.5,
they are classified as “free”. A country between 3 and 5 is “partly free”, and those who average
between 5.5 and 7 is deemed “not free”. The dataset here codes not free countries as 0, partly free
countries as 1, and free countries as 2.
As mentioned above, year observations typically go from January to December, but in the
1980’s there were some differences in this pattern. For example, from January 1981 to August
1982, there was only one rank for every country. As a result, the data set I constructed ranks years
1981 and 1982 with the same value. The ranking for August 1982 to November 1983 is the rank
provided for year 1983. The rest of the 1980’s decade has starting points that run from one
November to the next until 1990, where the years begin in January. This actually means that in the
80’s, US fiscal years (that begin in October) and Freedom House year’s match almost perfectly.
From the 1990’s until present, Freedom House scores begin from January to December. Aid data
for each country begins when they first appear in the Freedom House set as a country. Most states’
initial year on this dataset are consistent with the Correlates of War (COW), a public source project
on conflict and international relations.
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In their study of aid and democracy, Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson (2006) use
democratic assistance specifically as the primary independent variable. They disaggregate
governance aid from others forms arguing these programs should be examined specifically to
analyze actual USAID democracy promotion outcomes. I counter that, as Knack (2004) mentions,
all aid is theoretically conditional upon good political behavior. As such, assistance in any form
can prompt change in recipient actions. Their approach may be useful as a policy program study,
however, I look at all forms of aid (economic and military) because their purposes can also be
interconnected. Assistance designated for the health sector may be not necessarily come from
democracy allocations, but must be included. Such programs are designed to improve citizen
welfare and their progress can result in a more robust and engaged society. Any aid form can also
assist democracy indirectly by promoting societal modernization, thought to be crucial in
increasing demands for democracy (Knack 2004; Epstein et al. 2006). Likewise, military aid can
support the defense of a state against internal and external threats. Internally, defense and military
aid can have a negative impact on human rights if the country is overaggressive in its pursuits of
dangers or turncoats. It may also have a positive effect if a state strives to maintain civil rights and
liberties while eliminating violent and illegal opposition. Given the concerns of Finkel, PerezLinan and Seligson, I do separate economic and military aid in the models. I do not separate one
specific aid program from another, however. This methodology allows the researcher to see if
military aid and economic aid has the same or an opposite effect from each other.
Several important control variables have been added to investigate their effect on the
democracy relationship. They include, oil production and exports, country region, United Nations
affinity data, GDP per capita, and a former colony variable. A good deal of literature emphasizes
the importance (or lack of) of these concepts on democratic development (Przeworski et. al 2000,
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Dunning, 2004, Gartzke and Jo 1999). What each variable means and their significance is
described below.

4.2

Controls
The oil production and exports information come from the dataset developed by Michael

Ross and Paasha Mahdavi (2015). Two specific variables are being used. The first is net oil exports
per capita. This is measured as the value of oil exports divided by the population and converted
into 2000 constant dollars. These numbers only begin in 1986, which is why an oil production
variable was added that contains numbers going back to the 1940’s. Oil production is gathered by
the authors using sources such as the US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, The UN’s
“Wealth of Nations” dataset, and the US Energy Information Administration. Production values
were converted to measure in metric tons. These variables are important because an “oil curse”, as
coined by Ross (2000), is believed to be a reason why states fail to develop in stable ways. The
spoils of this unearned income appear to have an effect on the governance outcomes of nations.
This is paradoxical because one might expect additional wealth to assist stability rather than harm
it. Because the existing evidence indicates that natural resources are impediments to democratic
consolidation, they are included here.
United Nations Affinity scores are used to measure the degree that dyads in the UN vote
similarly to one another. These “s scores” are commonly used in the literature to compare policy
preferences among states. In its entirety, the scores have data for every possible country pairing
that is in the UN, an enormous wealth of information. For the purposes of this project, the scores
compiled are between the US and every other country found in Freedom House going back to
1972. I incorporate one particular variable from the dataset here, UN voting affinity based on
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“Yes” and “No” votes, as well as “Abstained”, between the US and country x. The range of the
scores are between -1 and 1 where more negative values denote less compatibility in policy
preference and more positive values mean increased compatibility. The numbers are also
interpolated by Gartzke, Jo and Tucker (2010) meaning that missing data are factored into that
measure. Some of the literature overviewed previously made a strong note that UN voting patterns
matter in aid distribution (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Here, similar UN affinity scores between the
US and another country can be used as a proxy for closer diplomatic ties and policy preference at
the UN.
Since relationships between colonies and former masters matter in aid studies, a variable
for this type of affiliation is included in the dataset. “Colony”, is coded dichotomously to
distinguish states that were at one time or another a colonial possession after WWII under the
control of a western government, or a former USSR client. The last group includes mostly
countries that came about in the early 1990’s and were newly formed. An inclusion of a colony
variable may show how these past political ties can have an impression on the shape recent
government takes. It is possible these unseen links have an impact on democratic development.
Information for all countries was taken from the US Office of the Historian which provides a
thorough synopsis of state recognition and general historical background for countries in the world.
Most states that were once colonies belonged to Britain, and not all that long ago. France has a
relationship with some African nations, but the bulk of former possessions appears to have
belonged to their island neighbors.
The final two variables included are, one for geographic location of the country, and GDP
per capita. “Region” adds a specific code for each state indicating their location in the world, and
are the same as those used by USAID. With this variable included, a researcher can isolate aid
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effects to certain areas of the world. This type of analysis, however, would only work in regions
where there is a meaningful amount of variance in scores. A statistical output for solely the Middle
East will not be of much use, for instance, since positive movements in that part of the world are
rare. For GDP per capita, numbers are logged and taken from Boehmer and Reuveny (2016) GDP
estimates are available for most countries in the world, but some exceptions exist. Myanmar is one
such example where these data are simply not available. North Korea, perhaps the most closed off
country in the world, also has a lack of data for its profile. Despite these holes, GDP is one measure
of a country’s wealth and likely to be associated with democratic movement. The base expectation
for GDP per capita is that the higher the number, the more likely the state is democratic.

4.3

Cox Proportional Hazards Modeling
To test the hypotheses of foreign aid and democracy, I use Cox proportional hazard models

(hereafter Cox Model) and the three level democracy designations from Freedom House. This
particular statistical method assesses the likelihood of an event occurring given the inclusion of
certain covariates. It serves as a survival analysis similar to those done in the medical field. In the
medical realm, survival rates could be used to estimate the life expectancy of a patient, for
example, if he or she has a certain condition. The outcome is typically binary where something
happens or it does not. In a medical case, death would be the “failure” event and the end of one
observation. By gathering data on a sample of patients, failure likelihood can be determined for
those who are in a similar medical condition. The researcher can introduce a treatment to the
patients and compare the survival rates between them. This method can have time varying
covariates (such as different quantities of a drug given over time) or static ones (such as a person’s
gender or race). The study is then done across a determined time horizon appropriate to the
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research question. If an event does not occur for one subject (a patient survives the length of the
study) this data is right censored. This is also the case if a subject drops out of the analysis. By
summing up this information, the model can predict the significance of the covariates on the failure
event and the rate at which an event will or will not occur.
Logistic regression is one common way of analyzing the odds of an x event happening and
typical of studies with binary outcomes. Most of the time, this method works well enough. In this
case, it is not appropriate because the event of interest is democracy improvement over time. If a
simply logistic regression were used, each year would be observed as a disparate event unrelated
to another. The model would treat aid and democracy in 1993 in Antigua, for example, as unrelated
to aid and democracy in 1994 in Antigua. Intuitively, we know this is not a logical assumption to
make because such dramatic political shifts do not typically occur out of the blue. Moreover,
democratic improvements and transitions take time to happen. By opting for the Cox method, the
researcher is able to account for the time it takes to move from “not free” to “partly free” and
“partly free” to “free”.
When the Cox model is used, it must adhere to the proportional hazards assumptions. This
means that the two values of a variable are proportional to each other across time. Gillespie (2006)
use the analogy of heart disease in men compared to women. If a male has twice the risk of heart
disease a woman has at age 50, the risk is also present at age 60. Number wise, a Schoenfeld
residuals post estimation test resulting in a p value above .05, indicates those assumptions have
not been violated. Graphically, two parallel lines for each value should be visible and indicates
there no violation of proportional hazard. If there is a convergence of crossing of lines on the graph,
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a violation can be assumed. Every model presented here is given the Schoenfeld residuals post
estimation test, and all fall above the .05 threshold1.
Time varying covariates require a degree of caution when used in analysis. Revisiting the
medical examples, it may difficult to determine the causality of a treatment related to survival
under certain modeling specifications. Fisher and Lin (1999) note that when employing regression
into the model, “if the effect of treatment on survival is predominantly mediated through the
covariate, such an analysis will show little or no treatment effect on survival.” The researcher
must be cautious in the inclusion of covariates and have a good theoretical grounding for their use.
Another example that may cause misleading inferences is if the treatment amount varies depending
on the health of the subject. In this case, the subject is partly driving the variation in the treatment.
This can be contrasted to static covariates, such as whether a person is a smoker or not. Assuming
the subject is consistently a smoker or non-smoker, survival analysis may illustrate the added risks
the former has in comparison to the latter. Fisher and Lin (1999) sum up by strongly advising that
the researcher must be cautious of inadvertently introducing biases, and accounting for other
possible explanations when using time varying covariates. Below, I use the UN affinity variable
as an example of how these concern may emerge.
In the survival analysis, quantities of foreign aid may be related to the “condition” of a
country. This issue is not a major concern because of how the data are set up for analysis. The
condition for all observations begins when a country is either partly free or not free, the dataset is
split up accordingly. In this sense, all the subjects are on the same level. One concern may be that
quantities of foreign aid may be higher or lower for a particular country due to their relationship

1

This visuals and post estimation results for each model are available upon request.
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to the US. Likewise, if a country is strategically salient (be it either partly free or not free) it may
also receive higher amounts of assistance.
The first issue is not as problematic here. Using the UN voting data to look at how countries
generally get along with the US, there is not much variance overall. Not free countries tend to vote
the least like the US, unsurprisingly, but states with higher freedom scores do not have much higher
affinity scores. See table 2. The second concern of strategic consideration is more difficult to assess
since that requires in-depth knowledge of the relationships between the two countries. Like it was
argued with Nicaragua, though, an underlying strategy not visible in the data should result in a
negative association between aid and movements toward democracy. Unfortunately, pinpointing
and identifying the strategic maneuvers would be impossible to capture here. The underlying
condition of countries being “strategically important” cannot be made. Moreover, these highly
important states may be so few, that they may not impact the model results all that much. This is
the nature of working with large N studies. Generally, the Cox method should provide worthwhile
data on the primary research questions this paper poses.

Table 2: United Nations Affinity Voting Averages by Country Type 1972-2010

Country Type
United Nations Affinity Averages
Not Free
-.355
Partly Free
-.295
Free
-.084
*-1 denotes least compatibility while 1 denotes most compatibility
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4.4

Model Specifications and Design

In this paper, foreign aid would be the treatment, a time varying covariate. The “failure”
event would be the positive democratic movement a state makes such as going from “not free” to
“partly free”. In this “not free” to “partly free” example, the death event is actually the end
period of one autocratic spell and beginning of a democratic opening. Static variables could include
the region a country is located or whether it was a colony or former Soviet state. Since the time
that aid is given is important to the theory, the observation periods are divided appropriately. The
same model is run with the same variables with the only difference being the time horizons in
which they are analyzed. The expectations, as indicated by the hypotheses, would be a negative
association between aid and democracy during the Cold War and after 9/11. The post-Cold War
period should see a positive and significant association.
Because aid is disbursed to most countries, the treatment is received by most all “patients”.
What is important is its positive or negative significance and rate of change in the specified years.
Since the outcome of an observation is either failure or no failure, the dataset is altered to examine
two possible outcomes at a time. The first possibility is a change from “not free” to “partly free”,
and the second is a change from “partly free” to “free”. In the first instance, all cases that are “not
free” are taken as a starting point and “free” states are disregarded. In the second instance, all
“partly free” states are a starting point and “not free” states are omitted. Using the medical analogy,
the “condition” that each state shares would be that they are either “not free” or “partly free” at the
beginning of the study. The death is when this form of governance changes to either partly free of
free.
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The master dataset begins its observations of countries in 1972, the year that Freedom
House began its work. The first set of democracy ratings from most states are dropped, however,
because the length of this status for that country was unknown. For example, Afghanistan is ranked
as being “partly free” for the year of 1972. In 1973, that rank is changed to “Not Free”. This is
problematic since there is no data available on how long prior to 1972 Afghanistan was considered
“partly free”. The survival analysis would take that one year into account only rather than the prior
years it could have lasted at that condition and the aid given at that time. Argentina, which was at
the height of its political tumult in the early 70’s is also classified as “partly free” in 1972, only to
change to “free” the following year. This issue is simply a function of when the democracy data
began to be collected, but with the dropping adjustment it is solvable. The lowest amount of time
a state is in a condition beginning in 1972 and is included in the analysis is four years. For countries
which begin their sovereignty or existence post 1972, this is not an issue because that would be
the first time it could be democratically judged.
The observations for every country vary across years with different starting points. An
inclusion of a time counter was added to make the time analysis consistent across subjects. Event
history data works on clock time as opposed to calendar time. This means that the actual year a
state enters the study is not relevant, what matters are the amount of years taken into consideration.
For example, a state such as Namibia first appears in 1989, while Afghanistan enters in 1973.
Using the time counter, the model does not distinguish these calendar years themselves, it views
each entrant’s first appearance as year one in clock time. The analysis then is dependent upon the
years based on this time counter. Country x may enter the dataset in 1980 and remain partly free
until 1990 with a change to free in 1991. The time counter would end at 12 in 1991, symbolizing
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that the move to consolidation took 12 years. In 1992, under its new free status, a new time counter
begins at 1 again.
Each country in the data is assigned their Correlates of War code across the entire 1972 to
2010 time frame (or from the time they first appear in Freedom House). Each change in freedom
has a corresponding country code, what Epstein et al. (2003) would call a “country spell.” These
changes are clustered around the COW code to account for possibility of repeated events among
one country. Afghanistan, the country at the top of the dataset, has a country code of 1, for its first
“partly free” year (which is actually dropped for reasons discussed above) and a 2 for its new status
as “not free.” The total changes in country codes, or “spells”, from 1972 to 2010 for Afghanistan
are nested in its COW code which is 700. Every time there is a change in freedom, there is a new
country code and new time counter to go with it. The year that a change occurs is the last year of
a particular counter and country code. This informs the models of the clock year the event
happened.
To briefly overview, every change in freedom has a new country code, and every country
code has its own new time counter. The time counter makes up the clock time for each observation
in the Cox model and these changes are nested within the COW code of the respective country.
This accounts for the possibility of repeated events so as each change in freedom is not estimated
independently on the country code. If the initial freedom score is almost immediately changed, it
is dropped because it is difficult to assess how long prior to 1972 that state would have been at that
democratic rating. The base models have the same covariates, but are run three separate times for
a Cold War, post-Cold War and post 9/11 eras.
To test the hypotheses of aid, time, and transitions, specific temporal cut points need to be
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established with some theoretical grounding. The Cold War era time frame here spans between
1972 and 1985. These years are chosen for three reasons. The first follows the example of Starr
and Lindborg (2003) that 1985 was the first year that over a third of world countries become free.
This indicates an upward trajectory may be occurring past this point. By limiting it to these years,
I can capture the full dynamic of the Cold War before the USSR began to liberalize. The second
reason 1985 is chosen, is that it marks the first year a reform minded Mikhail Gorbachev took over
as Soviet leader. His arrival initiated structural changes to the Soviet Union not seen previously
throughout the Cold War. Additionally, by 1986, the Soviet Union had begun to scale back their
military assistance to client nations like those in Africa (Herbst 1990). According to Dunning
(2004), this also led to a shuffling of priorities by Western governments such as the United States
in those countries. These models should demonstrate a negative association between assistance
and democratic movements, as outlined in hypothesis one and two. The post-Cold War period then
covers years 1986 to 2001. Hypotheses three and four will be tested for that era.
The last breaks in time are for the years after September 11, 2001, ranging from 2002 to
2010. It is true that aid year 2002 should have been decided by the beginning of 2001 which, of
course, would be prior to the attacks. However, by looking over the data on outlays it appears these
decisions were amended. In aid year 2002, economic assistance to Afghanistan jumped 500% and
was the first year it officially received military funds since 1978. This indicates that aid for the
purposes of combating terrorism should already be present here and began immediately after 9/11.
The variables for GDP per capita and UN voting patterns all end in 2008. Using World Bank
additions and affinity scores added by Voeten et al (2016), I stretch out the observations to 2010.
The last year net oil exports per capita are available is 2010, so this is the final year of analysis for
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the Cox models. These results should fit hypotheses five and six, a negative association between
aid and positive democratic shifts.
For each of these delineated periods, two models will be run. The first analyzes Not Free
states and their propensity to move to the Partly Free condition. The second examines Partly Free
States and their movement to the Free category. I do not include a Not Free to Free models because
these movements are extremely rare, more in line with individual case study analysis. Ideally, the
variables in each statistical run should be the same. These include: economic aid per capita,
military aid per capita, the log of GDP per capita, the log of population, net oil exports, UN voting
affinity, and the former colony variable. All are time varying covariates interacted with the time
counter except for the dummy colony variable. For the Cold War period, however, oil export data
are not available. To solve the issue, I use Ross’ (2000) oil production variable from the same
dataset as a proxy. After 1986 when export data first appear, I employ the exports variable which,
coincidently, neatly fits into the time frame divisions. For robustness, I also run oil production.

4.5

Data Descriptors
The section is designed to present a vivid picture of the data used in the forthcoming

analysis. Specifically, these tables will describe the general conditions of freedom in the world,
overall country characteristics. The dataset in its entirety consisted of over 6800 total years of
potential observations. The most notable descriptive statistics and countries in the data, are
presented below.2

2

A full illustration of these data are not possible to summarize here, however, the codebook and dataset are available

upon request.
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Table 3 displays the figures for average GDP per capita by world region. The region
variable is taken from USAID, meaning the countries in this dataset are labelled according regional
definitions of USAID. While some may argue of a need for distinguishing the Middle East from
North Africa, for instance, I coded and labelled to the standard set by the agency to maintain
consistency. Aggregately, the world GDP average is the second lowest on the table, subject to the
skewness caused by a majority of states which have low GDP values. One of the most troubled
regions in the world, South and Central Asia, has the lowest amount on average since 1972. Where
many of the world’s most developed countries reside, in Europe and Eurasia, the highest levels of
GDP can be found.
Table 4 describes the state of freedom for each region. As can be seen, the region with the
highest GDP per capita is also the region with the highest mean of Freedom House scores. The
assumption that poorer countries are more prone to being undemocratic does not hold up, however.
The Middle East and North Africa have the lowest freedom scores yet have the second highest
GDP per capita figure.
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Table 3: Nation Wealth: GDP Per Capita Averages by Region (logged) 1972-2010

Location
GDP per capita (logged)
World (Overall)
8.07
East Asia and Oceania
8.16
Europe and Eurasia
9.25
Middle East and North Africa
8.61
South and Central Asia
7.09
Sub-Saharan Africa
6.81
Western Hemisphere
8.53
*Lowest GDP Per Capita country = 4.16, Highest GDP Per Capita country = 11.36

Table 4: State of Freedom: Average Freedom House Scores by Region 1972-2010

Location
Freedom House Score Average
World (Overall)
1.06
East Asia and Oceania
1.09
Europe and Eurasia
1.56
Middle East and North Africa
0.46
South and Central Asia
0.68
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.65
Western Hemisphere
1.51
*Freedom Score Scale: Not Free=0 Partly Free=1 Free=2
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Table 5: State of Freedom: Freedom House Scores 1972-2010

Time Period
Freedom House Average Country Scores
Cold War (1972-1985)
.09
Post-Cold War (1986-2001)
1.1
Post 9/11 (2002-2010)
1.2
*Freedom Score Scale: Not Free=0 Partly Free=1 Free= 2

These numbers lead to speculation about how foreign aid may be distributed. If USAID is
dually committed to alleviating poverty and improving democratic conditions, South and Central
Asia and the Middle East and North Africa should be the highest recipients of aid. Table 6 shows
this is not necessarily the case. While both regions do appear on the list of highest aid recipients,
aid comes mostly in the military form, not the economic aid that should help promote better
governance development and result in poverty relief. Most economic aid over time is provided to
countries on the Western hemisphere. This may imply that while aid considerations are given to
all states, the US is biased toward the region where it resides. Note, however, that after 9/11
military and economic assistance shifted significantly toward the Middle East and North Africa at
higher, but comparable levels, than were seen during the Cold War.
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Table 6: Highest Economic and Military Aid Recipients by Region and Time Periods for Not
Free and Partly Free Datasets

Period

Highest
Regional
Economic
Recipient
Western
Hemisphere

Dollars Per
Capita

NF to PF Cold
$19.72 on
War (1972average
1985)
NF to PF PostWestern
$12.42 on
Cold War (1986- Hemisphere
average
2001)
NF to PF postMiddle East and $17.13 on
9/11 (2002North Africa
average
2010)
PF to F Third
Western
$17.60 on
Wave (1974Hemisphere
average
1997)
PF to F PostWestern
$13.03 on
Cold War (1986- Hemisphere
average
2001)
PF to F postMiddle East and $20.44 on
9/11 (2002North Africa
average
2010)
*Only 0.16 cents above the Middle East and North Africa

Highest
Regional
Military
Recipient
Middle East and
North Africa

Dollars Per
Capita

Middle East and
North Africa

$4.23 on average

South and
Central Asia

$12.49 on
average*

Middle East and
North Africa

$8.91 on average

Middle East and
North Africa

$8.10 on average

Middle East and
North Africa

$18.45 on
average

$15.64 on
average

Finally, table 7 lists two groups of consolidated democracies and hardened autocracies.
These are states that never change in their freedom score from either not free (hardened autocracy)
or free (consolidated democracy). While there are 13 disheartening examples in their lack of
democratic progress, there are far more examples of strong democratic regimes, 41 total (including
the United States). The final table of this section provides a snapshot of the how the dataset would
look for countries, using Afghanistan as an example. It provides a view of aid prior to 9/11 and
after 9/11.
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Table 7: Consolidated Democracies and Hardened Autocracies
Consolidated Democracies
Hardened Autocracies
Andorra
Chad
Australia
China
Austria
Congo(Kinshasa)
Bahamas
Cuba
Barbados
Equatorial Guinea
Belgium
Iraq
Belize
Libya
Canada
Myanmar
Costa Rica
North Korea
Denmark
Rwanda
Dominica
Saudi Arabia
Finland
Somalia
France
Vietnam
(West) Germany
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kiribati
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Micronesia
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Palau
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent & Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
*Freedom scores never change from either “free” or “not free” from time they enter the dataset.
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Table 8: Snapshot of Data Set for Afghanistan

Year

Economic
Aid (before
transformed
per capita)
1999
Afghanistan 0
27
2
47084739.23
2000
Afghanistan 0
28
2
70498744.65
2001
Afghanistan 0
29
2
108426530.4
2002
Afghanistan 0
30
2
503264130.7
2003
Afghanistan 0
31
2
787425411
2004
Afghanistan 0
32
2
1682497355
2005
Afghanistan 1
33
2
1189689619
2006
Afghanistan 1
1
3
1262098776
2007
Afghanistan 1
2
3
1204172468
2008
Afghanistan 0
3
3
2837051696
*Example of how the data set was coded with country code and time counter.

4.6

Country

Freedom
Score

Time
Counter

Country
Code

Military Aid
(before
transformed
per capita)
0
0
0
64457423.21
422077586.9
644911103.4
822858897.5
2122050070
4258332817
6679874249

Not Free to Partly Free Analysis
First, I present the analysis of the not free to partly free relationship. This dataset illustrated

the best results across time, largely because changes from full autocracies to partial democracies
have occurred often. The Cold War model from 1972 to 1985 on table 2, reveals economic aid to
be significant toward movements in governance. Military aid, meanwhile, is nowhere near a
statistical significance, logging in a fairly low z score. If foreign aid that falls under the economic
label is associated with quicker failure episodes (change to partial democracies), the Cold War
setting would appear to have no impact on America’s ability to promote democracy. Oil production
and GDP are signed as expect, negatively for the former and positively for the latter. Although
both variables come close, neither are significant as denoted by their respective z scores.
Inspecting the potential for failures across the time yields additional details on rates of
change. In figure 1, the 1972 to 1985 graphic, the hazard curves exhibit the likelihoods of failure
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for autocratic regimes given certain amounts of economic aid. The lines were drawn to illustrate
three possible quantities of disbursement; no economic aid provided, the mean of economic aid
for the time period, and one standard deviation above the mean. The graph indicates that from
1972 to 1985, economic aid not only helped transitions occur to the partly free condition, it caused
them to take place quicker. A country receiving the average amount of aid was 55% likely to
graduate politically from full autocracy by year four. This is compared to a state that received no
aid which has a roughly a 45% chance. Assuming a country begins to obtain economic aid at levels
of one standard deviation above the mean, their likelihoods of transitioning skyrocket to 85%.
Translated to dollars, the average amount of aid distributed between 1972 and 1985 was $7.55 per
capita, while the amount responsible for the 85% likelihood would be $45.193, a very large sum.

3

Averages in the analysis are for aid obligations prior to a shift in freedom from NF or PF respectively.

The averages are not for the master dataset which has aid figures for all countries across all freedom categories. The
region with the highest amount of economic aid on average was the Western Hemisphere at $19.52 per capita. When
the region is dropped, economic aid is still significant, oil production remains negative and GDP per person
increases to .05 levels. See table 12
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Table 9: Not Free to Partly Free States 1972-1985

No. of subjects =
92
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
38
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
43.42
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

331
841
0.0000
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid***

.0167654

.0044654

3.75

0.000

.0080133
.0255174

Military Aid

-.0034289

.0032846

-1.04

0.297

-.0098667
.0030089

Oil
Production

-.0324497

.0175626

-1.85

0.065

-.0668718
.0019724

Pop Log**

.0632765

.0295784

2.14

0.032

.0053038
.1212491

UN Affinity

-.0703474

.1501564

-0.47

0.639

-.3646485
.2239538

Colony

-.5613023

.5545511

-1.01

0.311

-1.648202
.5255979

.101663

.053316

1.91

0.057

-.0028344
.2061605

GDP

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level

69

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Economic Aid Per Capita Hazards 1972-1985 NF to PF

4

6

8
Years

10

Econ Per Cap=Mean
Econ Per Cap=0
Econ Per Cap=One St. Dev. Above the Mean

Figure 1: Economic Aid Hazards 1972-1985 NF to PF
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Table 10: Not Free to Partly Free States 1986-2001

No. of subjects =
117
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
66
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
34.53
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

810
879
0.0000
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid***

.0031586

.0008624

3.66

0.000

.0014683
.0048489

Military Aid

-.028712

.0151305

-1.90

0.058

-.0583672
.0009433

Oil Exports

-.0000151

.0000121

-1.24

0.214

-.0000388
8.71e-06

Pop Log

-.0111616

.0078625

-1.42

0.156

-.0265718
.0042485

UN Affinity

.0822511

.0470469

1.75

0.080

-.0099592
.1744613

Colony

.0958827

.4014608

0.24

0.811

-.690966
.8827313

GDP

.0037295

.010573

0.35

0.724

-.0169932
.0244523

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Figure 2: Economic Aid Hazards 1986-2001 NF to PF
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Moving over to the 1986 to 2001 era, the results are less encouraging. Economic aid is still
positively associated with movements, as are higher amounts. However, the rate of speed is much
lower. States with no economic aid have about 2% probability of movement, those at the mean
about 3%, and those one standard deviation above the mean about 5% at year six. As time moves
on, economic aid’s impact increases but only marginally. At year 15, at the highest level of aid on
the graph, the likelihood of transition hovers around 17%, while those with no aid are about 12%.
In the post-Cold War era, the average amount of economic aid stood at $4.65 and $17.51 one
standard deviation above the mean. Notice on table 3, military aid’s negative z score in this time
span jumps. While still insignificant, this is again unexpected. Ideally, if the theory was completely
correct both forms of aid should have been useful to initiating transitions.4
Post 9/11 the overall results are weaker than those presented above. There have not been
as many changes in part due to the minimal amount of observation years available. From the years
examined, analysis reveals economic aid to be relevant to democracy movements once again. Oil
exports per capita stand out in this model as higher oil revenues are related to the endurance of
autocratic regimes. Colony’s z score likely entails that old Soviet states and Western colonial
possessions have stagnated in their governmental evolution. It is possible these vulnerable

4

. The highest average of economic aid between 1986 and 2001 flowed to the Western Hemisphere ($12.42

per capita) and the highest average of military assistance found was in the Middle East ($4.23 per capita). I drop the
Western Hemisphere on one run and the Middle East on another. When the former is missing, the results are the
same. For the Middle East, military aid’s negative effects drop, but economic aid continues logging in as important
to transitions. Replacing oil exports for oil productions, the aid results are the same and oil performs very weakly.
See tables 13, 14 and 15.
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countries made the leap at one point to partly free, only to backslide into negative Freedom House
scores. It is difficult to make precise inferences because the focus is on movements in the positive
direction, but that is certainly a possibility. GDP behaves interestingly since it is often
hypothesized that more wealth can lead to heightened demands for democracy. The rates of change
graphic in figure 3 provides some perspective.
In an odd outcome, the results are much the same for the post 9/11 period as they are for
the 1986 to 2001 period, but more pronounced. The three curve lines which are present in the plot
region but indistinguishable, show the rates of change to partly free are almost identical across
economic aid quantities. Keeping in mind that economic aid is significant in the model at the .05
level, the visuals pose an interesting question as to why this could be. Delving into the data assists
the analysis. Glancing over Freedom House scores for the post 2002 era, it appears those states
which have not moved to partly free may just be hardened autocracies. Among the list of regimes
in this position include; Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, China, Russia, Brunei, North Korea,
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iran, Syria, and the UAE to name a few. Some of these countries have high
GDP’s, are former Soviet allies, and have oil resources. The regression model is likely taking into
consideration these lack of changes and amounts of time states like Yemen take to move to partly
free (although many do revert right back five years later) or Lebanon. The time consideration is
accounted for and the association for economic aid is positive. It is known, though, real world
conditions are very different. It is unlikely a state like China, Cuba, or North Korea, although these
are the most extreme examples, will change their ways regardless of aid given to democratic
minded reformers, NGO’s or political opponents. If this change is to happen, it will likely take
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close to a generation, sans a major, unforeseen event5. More importantly, if these events are to
happen, they are likely to be the result of some internal dynamic within those states as opposed to
large infusions of aid on America’s behalf.

Table 11: Not Free to Partly Free States 2002-2010
No. of subjects =
67
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
19
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
21.70
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

410
435
0.0029
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid**

.0004481

.0002031

2.21

0.027

.0000501
.0008461

Military Aid

-.0006666

.0006793

-0.98

0.326

-.0019981
.0006649

Oil
Exports***

-.000126

.0000371

-3.39

0.001

-.0001988 .0000532

Pop Log

-.0099188

.0110972

-0.89

0.371

-.0316689
.0118312

UN Affinity

-.2414281

.1923433

1.26

0.209

-.6184141
.1355579

Colony***

-1.318103

.4037857

-3.26

0.001

-2.109508 .5266976

.017299

-3.00

0.003

-.0858792 .0180685

GDP***

.0519738

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level

5

When the Middle East region which receives the highest amount of economic aid is dropped, economic aid per
capita drops from significance while higher oil exports remain the same. See table 16. There were 3 failure
episodes in the Middle East of not free countries: Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain.
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Figure 3: Economic Aid Hazards 2002-2010 NF to PF. Colors distinguish hazard curves
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Revisiting the hypothesis proposed:
H1: During the Cold War period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the not free to the partly free category.
H3: During the post-Cold War period, high levels of American increases the likelihood of a
transition from the not free to the partly free category.
H5: During the post 9/11 period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a transition
from the not free to the partly free category.
Hypothesis one is clearly incorrect since high levels of aid in its economic form increase
the likelihood of transitions. Hypothesis three, likewise, is incorrect since the rate of change for
movement in this era is much longer. Economic aid still has a strong effect leading to episode
failures, but across time it is slower. Additionally, military aid is actually negatively significant.
It is important to observe that after the Cold War, levels of economic and military aid dropped
precipitously. During the Cold War, the economic aid average was $7.55 per capita and dropped
$3 after it ended. Military assistance fell about 60%. Perhaps if economic levels of assistance had
consistently been maintained at Cold War levels and coupled with the drop of military aid better
outcomes would have resulted.
The final hypothesis, statistically, would seem to be incorrect. However, because not free
states in the 21st century seem unlikely to transition in a rapid way, the result is mixed. The
hierarchical theory would assume that the reason aid is not as useful for democratic movement is
that there is a security component tied to it due to the war on terror. There may well be such an
effect for some countries, but after analyzing which states were part of this not free group, it
would be erroneous to attribute a lack of transitions to security issues. It is more likely that these
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states are hardened autocracies which do not respond to aid. Some very well might, but only
incredibly large sums could cause alterations. Aggregately, there was a large increase of both
economic and military aid, five-fold ($5.19 compared to $0.99) and $4 more per capita for the
former after 2002. Even with these increases the differences in rate of change is difficult to
determine.
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Table 12: Not Free to Partly Free States 1972-1985
(Western Hemisphere Excluded)

No. of subjects =
79
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
28
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
49.51
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

290
760
0.0000
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid***

.021538

.0046386

4.64

0.000

.0124466
.0306294

Military Aid

-.0052484

.004196

-1.25

0.211

-.0134725
.0029756

Oil
Production

-.0327366

.0197738

-1.66

0.098

-.0714925
.0060194

Pop Log**

.0778596

.0333769

2.33

0.020

.0124421
.143277

UN Affinity

.0495912

.2016346

0.25

0.806

-.3456053
.4447878

Colony

.119232

.7946061

0.15

0.881

-1.438167
1.676631

GDP**

.1284294

.0541879

2.37

0.018

-.002223
.2346358

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level

79

Table 13: Not Free to Partly Free States 1986-2001
(Western Hemisphere Excluded)

No. of subjects =
109
Number of observations =
777
No. of failures =
60
Time at risk
=
846
Wald chi2(7) =
16.16 Prob > chi2
= 0.0237
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|
95% Confidence
Interval
Econ Aid***

.0045651

.0017826

2.56

0.010

.0010713
.008059

Military Aid

-.0290356

.0171748

-1.69

0.091

-.0626977
.0046264

Oil Exports

-.0000171

.0000138

-1.24

0.214

-.0000442 9.91e06

Pop Log

-.0080906

.0074373

-1.09

0.277

-.0226674
.0064862

UN Affinity

.0665703

.0469049

1.42

0.156

-.0253616
.1585021

Colony

.4927082

.4391837

1.12

0.262

-.368076
1.353492

GDP

.0110084

.0131406

0.84

0.402

-.0147467
.0367634

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Table 14: Not Free to Partly Free States 1986-2001
(Middle East and North Africa Excluded)

No. of subjects =
98
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
60
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
26.72
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

638
707
0.0004
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid***

.0023096

.0008426

2.74

0.006

.0006583
.003961

Military Aid

-.0386844

.0311057

-1.24

0.214

-.0996505
.0222817

Oil Exports

-9.63e-06

.0000159

-0.61

0.544

-.0000408
.0000215

Pop Log

-.0105553

.0072499

-1.46

0.145

-.024765
.0036543

UN Affinity

.0780395

.047326

1.65

0.099

-.0147177
.1707967

Colony

-.3111835

.4360468

-0.71

0.475

-1.165819
.543453

GDP

.0050031

.0099366

0.50

0.615

-.0144722
.0244785

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Table 15: Not Free to Partly Free States 1986-2001
(Oil Production Measure)

No. of subjects =
117
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
66
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
29.79
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

441
879
0.0001
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid**

.0064972

.0026254

2.47

0.013

.0013514
.0116429

Military
Aid**

-.0130353

.0063212

-2.06

0.039

-.0254246 .000646

Oil
Production

.0014577

.013028

0.11

0.911

-.0240766
.026992

Pop Log

-.0111348

.0164213

-0.68

0.498

-.0433199
.0210502

UN Affinity

.0997529

.0632948

1.58

0.115

-.0243026
.2238083

Colony

1.142334

.8670671

1.32

0.188

-.557086
2.841754

GDP

-.0002403

.0274156

-0.01

0.993

-.0539739
.0534933

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level

82

Table 16: Not Free to Partly Free States 2002-2010
(Middle East and North Africa Excluded)

No. of subjects =
51
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
16
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
33.32
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

309
332
0.0000
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid

.0037766

.0021879

1.73

0.084

-.0005115
.0080648

Military Aid

-.0033807

.0024098

-1.40

0.161

-.0081038
.0013425

Oil Exports**

-.0002433

.0001073

-2.27

0.023

-.0004537 .0000329

Pop Log

.0049829

.0229309

0.22

0.828

-.0399608
.0499266

UN Affinity

-.2544849

.2365617

-1.08

0.282

-.7181373
.2091675

Colony**

-1.226716

.5628403

-2.18

0.029

-2.329862 .1235688

GDP**

-.0475736

.0226955

-2.10

0.036

-.0920559 .0030913

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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4.7

Partly Free to Free Models
The models for partial democracies provided mixed results. First, the time period divisions

used for not free state could not be duplicated for partly free states. The reason seems to be that
these sort of changes are less common. When divided into shortened time periods, the models did
not come out useful for making solid conclusions. A closer look at the data shows many states that
are partially free either stay in that condition for a very long time, and in the breaks they do have,
they change back to a not free state. To work around the issue, I introduced a “third wave” model.
According to Huntington (1991) democratic changes tend to cluster temporally, or in “waves”.
Huntington observes that third time this happened in the 20th century was in the mid 1970’s, a
quick movement to democracy by a large number of states. Diamond in 1997 posed a question
about the third wave after noticing a stall in its progression, had it abruptly ended? I run an analysis
from 1974 to 1997 using Huntington and Diamond’s work as a basis for my start and endpoints to
test aid during the so called wave6. While it does intersect the Cold War, post-Cold War divisions,
partly free states move along slower. Providing them additional years to observe change will help
create a stronger output. I am able to run the base 1986 to 2001 model without breaking
proportionality assumptions to provide a comparison. The 2002 to 2010 base model is not possible
to run for this partly free data set because movements during these years are also scarce. To gain
some idea of the situation after 9/11, I stretch out the observational time to 1986 to 2010.
The results do not bode well for aid on table 17. Both economic and military types are
negatively associated, although not significant. Oil production continues to be detrimental to aid,
as well as colony. According to this model, those variables are the only ones that are significant

6

A Third Wave model for NF to PF states show economic aid is still positively significant while all other variables
are insignificant except for closer US affinity scores, which is positive.
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for democratic movement, or in this case, lack of democratic movement. The Western hemisphere
region logs in an average of about $17 per person in economic aid and the highest for that category.
If it is dropped from the base model, economic and military aid both jump to being significant,
negatively so, alongside colony and oil production (see table 14). This makes sense because many
democratizing countries during the Third Wave were in Latin America. With that area omitted of
the analysis, the negative association of both aid forms should spike. Oil production, a Middle
Eastern characteristic, and the fact most Latin American nations were not colonies post WWII,
explain the boosts for those variables.
Compared to the 1986 to 2001 model on table 6, the negative effects of military assistance
persist and are actually strengthened. It is important to note this 1986-2001 model is somewhat
weaker, but consistent in the military assistance findings for the Third Wave model and the not
free 1986 to 2001 model. Recall that the not free to partly free model for this year span also had
military aid with a negative z score (-1.90). The hazard curves for the years 1986 to 2001, however,
show that states receiving no military aid compared to those receiving average amounts, were only
2% more likely to transition. This indicates that while this form of assistance appears to be relevant
in the model, when inspected for change over time, the results are substantively different. A
reasonable conclusion may be that military assistance to partly free states have no bearing on their
democratic movements, regardless of the motivations behind granting it.
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Table 17: Partly Free to Free States 1974-1997: Third Wave Model

No. of subjects =
184
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
55
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
30.51
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

554
1329
0.0001
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid

-.0117371

.0067569

-1.74

0.082

-.0249804
.0015063

Military Aid

-.0298735

.017961

-1.66

0.096

-.0650764
.0053294

Oil
Production**

-.0317858

.0153231

-2.07

0.038

-.0618186 .001753

Pop Log

.0402806

.0240961

1.67

0.095

-.0069469
.0875082

UN Affinity

.2734834

.1403725

1.95

0.051

-.0016415
.5486084

Colony**

-.9432757

.4438423

-2.13

0.034

-1.813191 .0733607

.0573827

.0608393

0.94

0.346

-.0618602
.1766255

GDP

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Table 18: Partly Free to Free States 1986-2001

No. of subjects =
160
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
46
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
14.53
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

860
959
0.0425
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid

-.0014614

.0012047

-1.21

0.225

-.0038225
.0008997

Military
Aid**

-.0233294

.0104891

-2.22

0.026

-.0438876 .0027713

Oil Exports

-5.26e-06

8.58e-06

-0.61

0.540

-.0000221
.0000116

Pop Log

.0069475

.0096011

0.72

0.469

-.0118704
.0257654

.11337

.0782501

1.45

0.147

-.0399974
.2667375

-.4163755

.3242021

-1.28

0.199

-1.0518
.2190489

.0055084

.0116616

0.47

0.637

-.017348
.0283648

UN Affinity
Colony
GDP

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Figure 4: Economic Aid Hazards 1974-1997 PF to F
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Figure 5: Military Aid Hazards 1986-2001 PF to F
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Running an analysis from 2002 to 2010, the small number of failures generates an
insignificant model. I modify the 1986 period and extend it out to 2010. I drop the GDP variable
to avoid violating the proportional hazards assumptions, though, since its inclusion resulted in a
failing post estimation test. These results going across 57 failures, show military aid’s negative
relationship continues. Like the previous model, though, the likelihood of change over time is
about a 2% difference. Once again, despite its significance, the impact of military aid is largely
irrelevant. Across all years where useful results could be created with use of some theoretical
guidance, military aid is negatively associated with partly free failures while economic aid
fluctuates but remains negative.
The partly free analysis did not yield the best results. Given the negative associations of
aid broadly, though, it is possible aid can be functioning in one of two ways. It is either being used
to promote democracy with no effect, or it is being employed strategically to maintain stability.
Given the current terrorism situation, I believe the latter statement to be more accurate. The
likelihoods of change with or without aid are so similar, so it is possible that regardless of its
purpose, aid is not substantively linked to any freedom changes. The explanation that these nations,
along with other partly free states, may simply be too difficult to turn free cannot be dismissed
either.
Revisiting the hypothesis proposed:
H2: During the Cold War period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the partly free to free category.
H4: During the post-Cold War period, high levels of American aid increase the likelihood
of a transition from the partly free to free category.
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H6: During the post 9/11 period, high levels of American aid reduce the likelihood of a
transition from the partly free to free category.
While a 1972 to 1985 model could not be done, the Third Wave analysis works as a
substitute for hypothesis two. Both forms of aid perform somewhat poorly, and are negatively
signed. This means that while the world was in the process of greater governance improvements,
American assistance played no role during that time with partly free states. The oil curse is
persistent in the third wave and former colonies and Soviet clients had a difficult time being able
to transition beyond partly free. While the theory developed would attribute the time period and
security interests during the Cold War for these type of results, hypothesis four’s outcome causes
a reconsideration of that assumption. In the 1986 to 2001 era, military aid is significant and
negatively associated, while its economic form is not significant at all. While the model is weaker
than that of the not free to partly free version, this outcome invalidates hypothesis four. At the time
where conditionality was said to be its strongest, neither economic aid or military aid functioned
as expected. This means that hypothesis two, while accurate, cannot be attributed mostly to the
world security structure the Cold War fostered.
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Table 19: Partly Free to Free States 1986-2010

No. of subjects =
189
Number of observations =
1361
No. of failures =
57
Time at risk
=
1479
Wald chi2(7) =
18.88 Prob > chi2
=
0.0044
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|
95% Confidence
Interval
Econ Aid

-.0029793

.00181

-1.65

0.010

-.0065267
.0005682

Military
Aid**

-.0345662

.0150398

-2.30

0.022

-.0640437 .0050887

Oil Exports

-7.05e-06

8.29e-06

-0.85

0.395

-.0000233 9.19e06

Pop Log

.0052024

.0086845

0.60

0.549

-.0118189
.0222236

UN
Affinity**

.1542322

.0635909

2.43

0.015

.0295964
.2788681

Colony

-.4585956

.2718366

-1.69

0.092

-.9913856
.0741944

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Hypothesis six, could not be tested using the smaller 2002 to 2010 range. I expand the time
frame to have a starting point of 1986. The results once again show military assistance as
negatively significant. It is difficult to argue that this longer period is reflective of true post 9/11
conditions. However, the results are very similar to that of the all models generated for this data
set. The lack of movement toward the free condition after 2002 is also telling. Analyzing their
hazard curves, though, the actual impact of military assistance on democratic movement is
negligible. Partly free states seem to be one of the most difficult group of countries to analyze
when examining how democratization can be pushed along.
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Table 20: Partly Free to Free States 1974-1997 Third Wave Model
(Western Hemisphere Excluded)

No. of subjects =
146
Number of observations =
No. of failures =
38
Time at risk
=
Wald chi2(7) =
32.34
Prob > chi2
=
Variable
Coefficient
St. Error
z
P>|z|

426
1046
0.0000
95% Confidence
Interval

Econ Aid**

-.021906

.0089818

-2.44

0.015

-.0395101 .004302

Military
Aid***

-.0545393

.0202382

-2.69

0.007

-.0942054 .0148732

Oil
Production**

-.0427986

.0172711

-2.48

0.013

-.0766494 .0089478

Pop Log

.0663659

.037396

1.77

0.076

-.006929 .1396607

UN Affinity

.7269301

.1868501

3.89

0.000

.3607106
1.09315

Colony***

-1.390609

.5200445

-2.67

0.007

-2.409878 .3713405

.07493

1.20

0.230

-.0568953
.2368251

GDP

.0899649

**significant at .05 level

***significant at .01 level
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer two primary questions. First, how effective has foreign
assistance been at accomplishing its goal of democratic promotion? Second, under what security
circumstances is it more effective or less effective. The investigation of American foreign aid and
democratic improvement generated unexpected results. Contrary to the belief that aid would be
detrimental to positive changes in government during the Cold War, economic assistance was
found to be invaluable for not free states. After the Cold War, its effectiveness continued, albeit at
a far slower pace. This could have been a symptom of a drastic reduction in aid between 1986 and
2001. Following 9/11, the models were substantively similar to those of the post-Cold War era.
Economic aid should still, statistically, propel autocracies to improve to the partly free category.
An examination of the hazards, however, depicted the time span for failure to be almost identical
between that of a state receiving no aid and a state receiving above average levels. A possible
conclusion is that nations which were unable to transition before 2001 are hardened autocracies
such as China, Cuba, or Vietnam. The relationship between economic aid and partly free countries
seems much clearer, as it fails to net significance in several models. In those it does, it is negatively
associated with failures to free.
Meanwhile, military assistance was consistently insignificant or negatively linked to
freedom failures across both datasets. In the case of partly free countries, like economic aid,
military funds never came close to producing a positive association regardless of temporal
divisions. It may be that policymakers could have invoked this type of aid to maintain the stability
of important partial democracies, hence its negative relationship. On the other hand, they could
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have provided more assistance to these nations in hopes of improving unfavorable security
circumstances and thereby improving their political situations. If the second statement is true, by
handing out more of these funds, they may actually help entrench regimes with little interest in
full democratization (albeit marginally). Given the hazard curves, its real world effectiveness
irrespective of purpose, is somewhat dubious.
Economic aid and freedom shifts also have a bad news ahead. It would be unreasonable to
assume major autocratic nations and those struggling along presently, will be as impacted by any
level of aid as those during the Cold War. The pool of potential democratizers has dwindled over
time and those that remain are rigidly entrenched. An unfortunate possibility for those interested
in the spread of democracy, is that the good work economic aid did to transform countries in the
past, may not apply to the present. While it is good that many liberalized during the 70’s and 80’s,
if their evolution stalled out at partially free, their likelihood of moving forward now is dim. Partial
democracies appear to struggle mightily moving ahead and are prone to backsliding. Indicative of
this is economic aid’s insignificant impact for this group. Where it is negative and statistically
significant, the same logic applies to economic aid as that of military aid. Either more assistance
is given in the hopes of producing better governance to no avail, or it is given to shore up important
partly free regimes.
The research presented here make it clear three topics are in need of further study. First are
the motivations and efficacy of military aid. The outcomes of the survival analysis made unclear
the actual purpose of this form of assistance. Is it disbursed to help security and stability in the
hopes of observing more democratic governance? Or, is it given solely to stabilize salient, strategic
regimes? The paper attempted to shed light on the topic by dividing three time periods, two where
national security worries were elevated and one where they were less so. The results indicated
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military aid generally is negatively associated, or simply unhelpful with transitions, regardless.
There is no doubt this aid has a strategic component as evidenced by the regions where most
military assistance ends up. Untangling where it is used for certain aims and where it is used for
others should be further investigated. This is especially true if the goal is to discover the usefulness
assistance has in producing favorable American policies across the globe.
The second topic deserving of closer inspection is backsliding. This paper looked at only
forward progress, not reversals in good governance. The dataset indicates this happens quite
commonly to partly free states. For scholars interested in the successful diffusion of democracy,
foreign assistance’s ability to prevent backsliding is a worthwhile question to tackle. Going one
step further, researchers may study the dynamic between American foreign aid, strategically
important countries, and their propensity to move up or down the freedom scale.
Lastly, as Starr and Lindborg (2003) point out, the workings of partly free states are
undoubtedly an essential puzzle that must be put together. Countries residing on this middle ground
are more unstable and making movements to the free condition seems less likely to occur. The
process of change is slow with most movements going backwards instead of forward. A woeful
implication for the study of aid may be that generalizations about assistance to this set of countries
may not be as useful as we would wish. Any positive effects of aid on partly free states may require
specific country studies in specific contexts. Democracy scholars would be wise to additionally
investigate the symptoms found in these states that make transitions so difficult. On the debate of
dichotomous and graded levels of measurements for democracy, these results provide more
evidence to the argument that ordinal or interval scaling is the most appropriate method to
constructing democracy variables.
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With respect to the theory of foreign policy behavior, economic aid and military aid do not
work in tandem in helping or hurting democracy as was initially believed. While in some partly
free periods economic aid was negatively associated or insignificant, the positive result for not free
countries meant it was instrumental to these states as they moved toward democracy in the past.
Military aid may then be the form of assistance which is more related to strategy and security. If
true, since military aid’s negative associations were constant across time periods, security concerns
may always be strong. This does not mean that all periods are viewed in the same way by foreign
aid decision makers, though. The Cold War saw high averages for aid per capita distributions,
while the post-Cold War saw a large dip. After 9/11, the assistance numbers rose once again. The
average in the partly free data show economic aid per capita rose 35% when comparing 1986 to
2001 and 2002 to 2010. Military aid per capita increased 100% and are at the highest levels ever.
Moreover, most of those grants are distributed to the Middle East. Perhaps strategic countries
always acquire high levels of economic assistance and above average military support across all
time. During heightened security periods, these amounts are simply increased. States that are less
strategic, though, may receive greater amounts of economic aid with military assistance only given
at lower levels.
Comparing these results to the research of other American aid and democracy studies yields
interesting parallels and differences. Contrasted to Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998) who find
idealistic goals had overtaken strategic ones during the 1990’s, those conclusions are difficult to
support here. The analysis after 1986 show that aid not only dropped in total disbursements, the
effect it had was weaker than before on democratic shifts. Given the increases in military aid after
2001 and its negative associations with democracy, I would conclude that if their argument was
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true, its validity changed after 9/11. Judging from aid’s primary recipients after the attacks and the
form it took, it is difficult to argue assistance’s goals have not become more strategic.
Looking at Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson’s (2007) study, their results are similar but
more optimistic. Their work disaggregates democracy program funds from other aid types, while
I employ all aid forms but distinguish military from economic. Like them, I find a modest
worthiness to American assistance, particularly as it functioned in the past. I, however, question
its efficacy going forward. They conclude that substantial increases in democratic governance aid
can lead to much higher likelihoods of democratic improvement. While my not free to partly free
models demonstrate a similar outcome, looking at the hazards curves, the marginal increase in
likelihoods do not merit such an increase in expenditures. When limited to an analysis of partly
free states, the results are far less promising according to the Cox model.
There is much left to uncover about American foreign aid, strategic behavior and its
theoretical implications. The general principles of the hierarchical theory argued in chapter 3 may
still stand. The US may genuinely seek to promote democracy and use its resources to do so. Some
resources like military aid, however, may be designated for more calculated purposes in the
support of national security even if they are not conducive to democracy. This is a conscious
decision made by policymakers that hierarchically prioritize foreign policy objectives. Such
ordering of preference behavior should be expected by any nation, because at their core, all nations
are realist oriented. Rather than focusing solely on time periods, looking at regions and specific
country dynamics could provide more fruitful results. Beyond theory development, clear results
about whether foreign assistance is useful in accomplishing our global goals is important to gather.
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While the state of foreign aid may seem grim, it would be a mistake to say US assistance
is a wasteful enterprise. Aside from the goal of democracy, much assistance has been granted to
alleviate the living conditions of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. Medicinal
improvements, disaster relief, food rations and educational improvements have all been made
possible in part by the American people. Long term, these gestures may in fact help build up robust
societies that demand responsive government. If democratic promotion is the primary goal, though,
policymakers would be wise to be selective in who they give funds to and when. The work of the
Millenium Challenge Corporation, which works in such a selective way, will be interesting to
investigate once more data is available on their efforts. In the meantime, examinations of military
aid, partly free states and how backsliding can be prevented, should inform foreign aid decision
makers on how they can best pursue specific foreign policy goals. The tricky part for researchers,
is figuring out which goals are sought out where and for what purpose.
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